

# AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT

## ITS BACKGROUND IN PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE

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# Corrigendum

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## PREFACE

The present work which for the first time, seeks to offer a systematic account of the background of the concept of *rasa*, is the outcome of twelve years of study in different centres of classical learning all over India. The author had the unique opportunity of working with three great scholars, two of whom alas, are no longer living. They are Mahamahopadhyaya Gopinath Kaviraja, M.A., D.Litt., the late Mahamahopadhyaya Yogendranath Bagchi, D.Litt., and the late Mahamahopadhyaya Vidhusekhara Bhattacharyya, D.Litt. The work has been principally carried out in Banaras and Calcutta, though the author has worked in Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, as also in Madras.

This work on *rasa* might appear as extremely unorthodox, and shock many prejudices and upset many dogmatically held opinions. The author has pointed out in the Introduction the broad lines of difference with the work of Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, M.A., D.Litt., Mahamahopadhyaya P. V. Kane, M.A., D.Litt., and Dr. S. K. De, M.A., D.Litt. A scholar working in any branch of *Alamkara* would be ungrateful if he fails to acknowledge his great indebtedness to the work of these scholars of first eminence. But the author has become more and more convinced that inspite of the real merit and excellence of their work, it is exclusive, cut off from the broad currents of Bharata's contemporary thought (vide Introduction). It is not with a little regret that he has to turn away from his first lessons in *Alamkara*.

This work urges on all disinterested lovers of knowledge to look at the problem of *rasa* from a comprehensive standpoint, including body, mind and over-mind. The problem is at once physiological, psychological and metaphysical. It is unfortunate that the problem of *rasa* has so long been looked at as if it belongs exclusively to mind. A careful study of this thesis will convince an impartial critic that in ancient Indian thought, mind is not divorced from body, just as in another direction, it is inalienably associated with over-mind. The relation of body and mind, and Bharata's great indebtedness to Ayurvedic speculations have been worked out in detail for the first time in Chapters II, VI, VII and VIII. The relation of mind and over-

mind has been analysed in Chapter XI. These materials and standpoints, brought in for the first time, make necessary a complete re-orientation of the concept of *rasa*. Such an analysis of the concept of *rasa* in conformity with the philosophical and physiological speculations of the ancient Hindus has been attempted in Chapters IX and X.

Scholars who find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the position that Bharata is deeply indebted to Ayurveda, should remember that an exactly similar position is held in European aesthetics. The pathological background of Aristotle's *katharsis* of pity and fear is well-known. Dr. Bernays in *Zwei Abhandlungen die Aristotelische Theorie des Drama* (Berlin, 1857) has shown how the doctrine of *katharsis* is deeply influenced by Greek medical speculations. As early as 1954, the present writer in a booklet, "A Brief Introduction to a Comparative Study of Greek and Indian Poetics" pointed out the broad lines of parallelism between Greek and Indian medical and aesthetic speculations.

The truth in this ancient doctrine of the Hindus and the Greeks that body and mind are inter-dependent, has been re-emphasized in modern times by writers and scientific workers. In spite of Descartes' denial that body and mind are keyed together (vide Introduction and Ch. III), there is a growing consciousness that the one cannot be separated from the other, and for a proper understanding of any one, the two must be taken together. In the growth of this consciousness, scientists, psychologists, medical men as well as aesthetes have played equal part. The position though it was visualised and formulated more than two thousand years ago in India as also in Greece, emphasize an essentially modern standpoint, accepted by physiologists and psychologists alike. Pavlov and J. B. S. Haldane (with whom the author had the opportunity of discussing the problem) have verified the truth of this contention from the physiologist's standpoint, while there is almost overwhelming evidence from the standpoint of the psychologist, as can be seen from the works of Macdougall, Jung and I. A. Richards.

The author gratefully remembers the host of scholars, who took a keen interest in his work. He particularly remembers with gratitude those few teachers and well-wishers, who have all along stood by him.

The first among these few well-wishers is his father, Prof. M. Sen, M.A., who first suggested the basic idea of this dissertation, and whose insight and enthusiasm have been unfailing sources of inspiration to him. He acknowledges further his

great indebtedness to his teacher, Dr. M. M. Bhattacharje, M.A. Ph.D., Head of the English Department, Calcutta and Viswabharati Universities, who with kindly and scholarly interest, read through the whole of his thesis and suggested improvements. He remembers with gratitude the generous encouragement he had received from the late Kaviraja Rakhaldas Kavyatirtha, who was an institution by himself, the late Dr. S. B. Das Gupta, Ph. D., Prof. K. B. Roy, M.A., Dr. S. K. De, D.Litt. (London), Dr. Nihar Ranjan Roy, D.Litt., (Paris), Director, Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla, Dr., A. C. Banerjee, Ph.D., Centenary Professor of International Relations, Calcutta University, Dr. A. Bose, D. Phil. (Oxon), Sir Gurudas Professor of English, Calcutta University and Dr. R. C. Hazra, D.Litt. (Dacca), Post-Graduate Research Department, Sanskrit College, Calcutta. The work would never have been completed without their active guidance and advice.

He also acknowledges with thanks the co-operation he received from the management and staff of Venus Printing Works, Calcutta.



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## Aesthetic Enjoyment

Its Background in Philosophy and Medicine

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παλιν δε αρμοττομενης τε και εις την αυτης  
φυσιν απιουσης ηδονην γιγνεσθαι λεκτεον.

ΦιληΒοΣ. 31d.

निर्दोषं हि सम ब्रह्म

—Bhagavad-Gita. 5. 19



## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is not only about Rasa, but also about the sources and origin of the concept of Rasa. There is throughout this essay an implicit understanding that any broad and significant movement, whether, in art or in philosophy, cannot be adequately understood, if it be studied separately from the study of contemporary movements in other branches of knowledge. It is a common assumption in literary criticism and aesthetics, that the sources of literature are irrelevant or unimportant, and that literature can be completely criticised and appreciated in terms of literature. There was for some time, a similar philosophy about the study of nature—the mechanical materialism of d'Holbach, adopted unconsciously by most scientists to-day. It was supposed that matter could be completely described in terms of itself, and since man is made of matter, these terms would describe him as well. This philosophy began by divesting matter of all those qualities, which have a subjective or mental component—colour, solidity, taste. There is no place of taste or rasa in this scheme. Mass, size, time and space were regarded as objective material qualities—matter described in terms of itself.

While mechanical materialism was developing the objective or contemplated aspect of matter, idealism was developing its active or subjective side. Idealism became the study of sensuousness, and sensing is an active process. The world as known to man was shown to consist only of sensory qualities—forms, concepts and ideas. In Abhinavagupta, one comes perilously close to such a standpoint, where all objective entities are found to be rooted in a subjective basis.

Mechanical materialism and Idealism are not peculiar to philosophy, but are expressed in the science, aesthetics and history of man. If poetry be approached by a mechanical materialist, in psychology, it will be regarded as a form of behaviour; if by one in philosophy, it will be regarded as nothing but the gratification of the "aesthetic" sense, inherent in matter organised in a human body. The Idealist position

is generally regarded as a more suitable approach to poetry, which is then explained in terms of the Beautiful, the True or the Good.

The mechanical materialists of art regard the art work, a poem or a fine piece of sculpture, as the detached object, and attempt to elicit a theory of art, from which the subject or artist is excluded, a theory written in terms of the technique, or forms of the art. It is supposed that when the devices, technique, and "abstract" qualities of the art, which can be examined independently of the artist, have all been extracted and reduced to theory, art will have been described in its own terms. Vamana sums up this attitude to art, when he writes, *riti-ratna kavyasya*. This stand in aesthetics is the theory of "formalism", and it is evident that as a theory, it corresponds in aesthetics to mechanical materialism in philosophy. Like these philosophers, the formalists or the followers of *riti* are left at the end with merely objective realities, with concepts, ideas, schemes and dogmas.

The psychological approach to art of the modern expositors of Rasa theory, like Dr. Das Gupta, Mm. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, professes to follow the subjective idealism of the great Abhinavagupta. These eminent writers regard the art work as subjective, as the "feeling" in the mind of the appreciator or artist, and proceed to explain the Rasa theory, entirely on this basis. They believe that the aesthetic emotion, or *rasa* is ultimately final, unquestionable, completely divorced from the world of reality. It is wholly inside them; and any criticism of art is purely personal and subjective.

This splitting up of the subjective and objective attitude to art among the modern expositors of Rasa theory, has very largely obscured the background of the concept of Rasa. The analysis of the modern interpretation of Rasa theory in Sec. II, will indicate how seriously their exposition has suffered from this split, this lack of integration of the different approaches to the question of aesthetic enjoyment.

## II

It is interesting to note that this fragmentation and lack of integration among the moderns, who look at Rasa specula-

tions as self-sufficient, independent of large and moving forces in society and philosophy, is in a sense, a mis-interpretation of the aesthetic position of Abhinavagupta, and not the legacy of any great Indian philosopher. It is essentially the result of a deep penetration of European thought and its very significant influence on modern students of Alamkara. This influence has been sometimes conscious; but more often, present day writers on Rasa, like Dr. Das Gupta and Dr. De have been unconsciously echoing the standpoint of European aesthetics. The subjective idealism of Abhinavagupta, divorced from the wider background of his philosophy, also emphasized the self-sufficiency of Rasa. It would have been excellent if the present-day expositors had gone back to the integrated vision of the ancient Greeks, a position very similar to the one held by Bharata.\* But it is a misfortune that instead of going back either to the ancient Hindus or the ancient Greeks, they have unconsciously taken up the attitude of Descartes, when there was for the first time a split in the integrated vision of ancient philosophy.

Ancient philosophy, whether in Babylon, Egypt,<sup>2</sup> India, or Greece,<sup>3</sup> shows unmistakably this integrated pattern of thought. No branch of this integrated pattern of thought could be well understood, without carefully consulting all others. Dr. Radhakrishnan rightly observes in his Introduction to "Indian Philosophy" (Allen and Unwin), vol. I. p. 31 (1948), "It is the synthetic vision of India that has made philosophy comprehend several sciences, which have become differentiated in modern times. In the West, during the last hundred years or so, several branches of knowledge till then included under philosophy, economics, politics, morals, psychology, education have been one by one sheared away from it. Philosophy in the time of Plato meant all those sciences, which are bound up with human nature, and form the core of man's speculative interests. In the same way in ancient Indian scriptures, we possess the full content of the philosophic core. Latterly in the West, philosophy became synonymous with metaphysics, or the abstruse discussions of knowledge, being and value, and the complaint

1 A Brief Introduction to a Comparative Study of Greek and Indian Poetics and Aesthetics—R. Sen.

2 Before Philosophy—H. Frankfort and others (Pelican Books)

is heard that metaphysics has become absolutely theoretical being, cut off from the imaginative and practical sides of human nature".

This disintegration of the unified field of knowledge into several distinct and independent branches has been contagious, and underlies the Rasa speculations of the modern expositors. It is useful to remember that the modern attitude to the world, as either matter or mind, does not go beyond Rene Descartes. The history of modern European philosophy begins with Bacon, Jacob Boehme and Descartes. There is a complete disparity between these first two philosophers. But both are modern in the sense that they have completely broken away from the integrated vision of the Middle Ages. Both agree that mind operates in the content of its knowledge, as in its own domain, and this consequently appears as concrete Being. This domain in Bacon is the finite, natural world; in Boehme, it is the inward, mystical, godly Christian life and existence; for the former starts from experience and induction, the latter from God, and the pantheism of the Trinity. The disintegration which set in with Bacon and Boehme came to a head with Descartes. With him, the chasm which had been widening from the beginning of the Renaissance, became almost unbridgeable.

The philosophy of Descartes first brought to completion, or very nearly to completion the dualism of mind and matter, which began with Plato, and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy. The Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other. There is a considerable discussion in the *Meditations*, as to why the mind feels "sorrow" when the body is thirsty. The correct Cartesian answer was that the body and the mind were like two clocks, and that when one indicated "thirst", the other indicated "sorrow".

One immediate result of Descartes' philosophy was the re-opening of the question of the relation between soul and body, that is the return of the object within itself in such a way that thought posits itself in another, in matter. Descartes believed that there could be no unity of soul and body. The former belonged to thought, the latter to extension; and thus because both are substance, neither requires the notion of the other, and hence soul and body are inde-

pendent of one another, and can exercise no direct influence upon one another. Soul could only influence body in so far as it required the same, and conversely—that is, in so far as they have actual relation to one another. But since each is a totality, neither can bear a real relation to the other. Descartes consistently denied the physical influence of one on the other; that would have a mechanical relation between the two. Descartes thus established the intellectual sphere in contradistinction to matter, and on it based the independent subsistence of mind: for in his cogito "I" is at first only certain of itself, since I can abstract from all. The necessity of a mediator to bring about a union of the abstract and the external and individual was felt. Descartes settles this by placing between the two what constitutes the metaphysical ground of their mutual changes, God. He is the intermediate bond of union, in so far as He affords to the soul in what it cannot bring about through its own freedom, so that changes in body and soul may correspond with one another. Faced with the problem of the relation of body and soul, Descartes invented a *deus ex machina*, who is to solve all such problems. But the dualism of body and mind was never far away from his thought.

Though Cartesianism proved to be a great impetus to science, it undermined for ever the integrated vision of the ancient world. It was no longer possible for any one to take all knowledge for one's province. An arbitrary distinction grows up between science and philosophy; and every one is a specialist. The fragmented view of art and life was not confined to the particular branch of study, like history or literature. It was carried vigorously to all branches of knowledge, so that it became impossible for a biologist to know the laws of physics, or of mathematics, or for a chemist to know the laws of sociology, or of anthropology. It is not possible to estimate to-day the extent of damage to knowledge, as a result of this fragmentation and specialisation. This explains the great difficulty of understanding the thought-pattern of a different age. It is for this that a great writer like Bharata can never be adequately understood, if he be looked at merely as the first expositor of Rasa theory in *Alamkara*. To understand Bharata and the full implications of his Rasa theory, he must be looked at as the spokesman of his age.

In granting that Bharata is representative of his age, it is necessary at the same time, to find out the pattern of Indian thought in the early Christian era (See Ch. VI for Bharata's date). Bharata's encyclopaedic work unmistakably shows great influence of the age to which he belonged. The pattern of thought of a particular age permeates all branches of speculations, and is the golden chain which binds together all knowledge of that age. Bharata's work, which forms a part of this larger pattern, would be unintelligible, unless it be read as a representative work of his times.

Each age of philosophical reconstruction and emphasis, shows certain striking traits, which distinguish it from all others. Hegel distinguishes three such periods in the history of European philosophy, each period showing a distinctive trait. These periods are, according to Hegel, that of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of the Middle Ages, and modern philosophy. "Of these, the first is, speaking generally, regulated by thought, the second falls into the opposition between existence and formal reflection, but the third has the Notion as its ground"<sup>4</sup>. Hegel thus finds one characteristic trait, a dominating thought in each of these three ages.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in his Introduction to "Indian Philosophy", vol. I. Sec. V, arrived at a similar division of Indian Philosophy into several periods of thought. The broad divisions of Indian philosophy are (1) the Vedic period (1500 B.C.—600 B.C.) covering the age of the settlement of the Aryans, and the gradual expansion and spread of the Aryan culture and civilisation. "We discern in it successive strata of thought, signified by the Mantras or the hymns, the Brahmanas and the Upanishads. The views put forward in this age are not philosophical in the technical sense of the term. It is the age of groping, where superstition and thought are yet in conflict."

(2) "The Epic Period (600 B.C.—200 A.D.) extends over the development between the early Upanishads and the darsanas, or the systems of philosophy. The epics of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata serve as the vehicles, through which was conveyed the new message of the heroic and the

<sup>4</sup> History of Philosophy, vol. I—Introduction (Routledge and Kegan Paul) Reprinted 1955.

godly in human relations. In this period, we have also the great democratisation of the Upanisad ideas in Buddhism and the Bhagawad Gita. The religious systems of Buddhism, Jainism, Saivism, Vaisnavism belong to this age . . . . Most of the systems had their early beginnings about the period of the rise of Buddhism, and they developed side by side through many centuries". The Buddhism and the Jainism agreed on one particular point with Saivism and Vaisnavism, a standpoint shared also by the Patanjala system. This is the concept of visuddhi or purification. This might be called the spirit of the times. No wonder that this concept runs throughout the Rasa-speculations of Bharata (See chs. IV and V), who has imbibed the ideas of his age.

(3) The third and the fourth periods are less important from the standpoint of the present thesis. "Of these, the third or the Sutra period (from 200 A.D.) shows a growing development of a critical attitude in philosophy. "The earlier efforts to understand and interpret the world were not strictly philosophical attempts, since they were not troubled by any scruples about the competence of the human mind or the efficiency of the instruments and the criteria employed . . . . So when we come to the Sutras, we have thought and reflection become self-conscious, and not merely constructive imagination and religious freedom". Of all six systems, the Samkhya, as pointed by Prof. Garbe and Prof. Das Gupta, is the oldest. This possibly explains why the greatest debt of Bharata is to the Samkhya, specially to that branch of it, championed by Patanjali and Vindhyavasini (See ch. VI).

(4) The fourth or the Scholastic Period also begins with the second century A.D., "It is not possible for us to draw a hard and fast line between this and the previous one. Yet it is to this that the great names of Kumarila, Samkara, Sridhara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Vacaspati, Udayana, Bhaskara, Jayanta, Vijñanabhikṣu and Raghunatha belong".

This thesis is the first systematic attempt to read Bharata's *Natya-Sastra*, and specially the doctrine of *Rasa* against the background of its age. We have to note that the illuminating discussions of *Rasa* by such eminent scholars as Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Mr. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. K. De, are all carried in vacuo, divorced from the main trends of Bharata's times. It is the firm belief of the present writer

that the concept of Rasa can be adequately understood, only when it is studied against the background of its age. The proper background of Bharata's *Natya-Sastra* is the second period of philosophic consolidation, as outlined by Dr. Radhakrishnan. This will explain Bharata's indebtedness not merely to Patanjali speculations, but also to Abhidhamma analysis (See chs. II, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI), as also to the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and the *Yuganaddha* and *Prajñopaya* in Buddhism (See chs. IX and X).

### III

It is necessary to have a résumé of Rasa theory, as analysed by Dr. Das Gupta, Mm. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. K. De here, for a fuller understanding how the theory, expounded throughout this thesis, differs in certain fundamental and essential points, from theirs. Mm. P. V. Kane in his Preface to *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (1951) claims that he along with Dr. De "were thus practically pioneers in this field". Mm. Kane substantiates this statement, and writes, "So far as the text and Notes (on *Sahitya-Darpana*) were concerned that edition (of 1923) was a reprint of the edition of 1910. But I prefixed an Introduction of about 177 pages, dealing with the History of *Alamkara* Literature. Almost in the same month in which my book appeared, Dr. De published the first first volume of his *History of Sanskrit Poetics*. The second volume of the latter was published by Dr. De two years later in 1925". Dr. Das Gupta's *Kavya-vicara* in Bengali was published as late as 1939. The long article on the history of *Alamkara* literature by Dr. Das Gupta came out in *History of Sanskrit Literature—Classical Period* (Calcutta University) only in 1947. Though there is a good deal of difference on points of scholarly interest among these three authorities on *Alamkara* literature, there is at least agreement on one particular point. It is the paucity of materials about the background of Bharata. What is even more significant is that all these three eminent authorities are content to explain away Bharata's exposition of Rasa as a rude beginning, not deserving to be ranked as a branch of serious philosophic speculation.



Mm. P. V. Kane in p. 345 of his "History of Sanskrit Poetics" (1951) enumerates the "several works that expound the theory of rasa realisation, such as the *Natya-Sastra*, vi-vii, with the commentary of Abhinava, the *Saraswati-Kantha-bharana V*, the *Sringara-prakasa*, *Dasa-rupaka*, *Sringara-tilaka*, *Bhava-prakasanam* and *Rasa-tarangini*. It is not possible to describe in detail what all these works have to say, to mark out the points of difference among some of them. Bharata's text being the earliest one I shall rely on that text, and the *Abhinava-bharati* therein, and briefly set forth the several interpretations of that Sutra". Mm. P. V. Kane admits that his interpretation of Bharata's *Rasa-sutra* closely follows that of *Abhinavagupta*. He takes it for granted that Bharata and *Abhinavagupta* belong to the same philosophic tradition (for a criticism of this view, see ch. IX). This is significant, for it should be clearly recognised that *Abhinavagupta's* commentary on the *Natya-Sastra*, inspite of its brilliance and exhaustiveness, has been very largely responsible for obscuring the proper background of Bharata's *Natya-Sastra* (See Chs. VI, IX).

Mm. P. V. Kane gives his own exposition of Bharata's *Rasa* theory. In p. 346, he writes, "The permanent or dominant moods that may be aroused by a dramatic representation and brought to a state of pleasurable relish are eight, rati (love), hasa (gaiety or laughter), soka, krodha, utsaha (energy or vigour), bhaya, jugupsa (repugnance) and vismaya, . . . . The resultant aesthetic enjoyment and pleasure are called *rasa*". Mm. P. V. Kane seems to think that the permanent or dominant moods, which Bharata calls *sthayi-bhavas*, are themselves pleasurable in nature, a view openly contradicted by the etymology of the word "*bhava*", which in Buddhist and Patanjala parlance, means "life" or "suffering" (See Chs. II and XI). Mm. Kane also nowhere discusses how it is possible for *sthayi-bhavas* to become *Rasas*. He takes it to be axiomatic that stimulated *sthayi-bhavas*, fed on by *vibhavas*, at once pass to the *Rasa* stage.

It may be noted further that Mm. P. V. Kane in p. 354-5, accepts with Bhatta Nayaka that *rasa-swada* is in the same category with *para-brahma-saksatkara*. As *para-brahma* is *ananda-maya*, so is the apprehension of *rasa*. But he never attempts to explain how a pleasure which belongs primarily to the *laukika* plane, becomes transformed into an *aprakrita*!

that the concept of Rasa can be adequately understood, only when it is studied against the background of its age. The proper background of Bharata's Nāṭya-Sāstra is the second period of philosophic consolidation, as outlined by Dr. Radhakrishnan. This will explain Bharata's indebtedness not merely to Patañjali speculations, but also to Abhidhamma analysis (See chs. II, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI), as also to the Bhagavad-Gītā, and the Yugañaddha and Prajñā-pāya in Buddhism (See chs. IX and X).

### III

It is necessary to have a résumé of Rasa theory, as analysed by Dr. Das Gupta, Mm. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. K. De here, for a fuller understanding how the theory, expounded throughout this thesis, differs in certain fundamental and essential points, from theirs. Mm. P. V. Kane in his Preface to History of Sanskrit Poetics (1951) claims that he along with Dr. De "were thus practically pioneers in this field". Mm. Kane substantiates this statement, and writes, "So far as the text and Notes (on Sahitya-Darpana) were concerned that edition (of 1923) was a reprint of the edition of 1910. But I prefixed an Introduction of about 177 pages, dealing with the History of Alamkāra Literature. Almost in the same month in which my book appeared, Dr. De published the first first volume of his History of Sanskrit Poetics. The second volume of the latter was published by Dr. De two years later in 1925". Dr. Das Gupta's Kāvya-vicāra in Bengali was published as late as 1939. The long article on the history of Alamkāra literature by Dr. Das Gupta came out in History of Sanskrit Literature—Classical Period (Calcutta University) only in 1947. Though there is a good deal of difference on points of scholarly interest among these three authorities on Alamkāra literature, there is at least agreement on one particular point. It is the paucity of materials about the background of Bharata. What is even more significant is that all these three eminent authorities are content to explain away Bharata's exposition of Rasa as a rude beginning, not deserving to be ranked as a branch of serious philosophic speculation.

Mm. P. V. Kane in p. 345 of his "History of Sanskrit Poetics" (1951) enumerates the "several works that expound the theory of rasa realisation, such as the *Natya-Sastra*, vi-vii, with the commentary of Abhinava, the *Saraswati-Kantha-bharana V*, the *Sringara-prakasa*, *Dasa-rupaka*, *Sringara-tilaka*, *Bhava-prakasanam* and *Rasa-tarangini*. It is not possible to describe in detail what all these works have to say, to mark out the points of difference among some of them. Bharata's text being the earliest one I shall rely on that text, and the Abhinava-bharati therein, and briefly set forth the several interpretations of that Sutra". Mm. P. V. Kane admits that his interpretation of Bharata's *Rasa-sutra* closely follows that of Abhinavagupta. He takes it for granted that Bharata and Abhinavagupta belong to the same philosophic tradition (for a criticism of this view, see ch. IX). This is significant, for it should be clearly recognised that Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Natya-Sastra*, in spite of its brilliance and exhaustiveness, has been very largely responsible for obscuring the proper background of Bharata's *Natya-Sastra* (See Chs. VI, IX).

Mm. P. V. Kane gives his own exposition of Bharata's *Rasa* theory. In p. 346, he writes, "The permanent or dominant moods that may be aroused by a dramatic representation and brought to a state of pleasurable relish are eight, *rati* (love), *basa* (gaiety or laughter), *soka*, *krodha*, *utsaha* (energy or vigour), *bhaya*, *jugupsa* (repugnance) and *vismaya*, . . . . The resultant aesthetic enjoyment and pleasure are called *rasa*". Mm. P. V. Kane seems to think that the permanent or dominant moods, which Bharata calls *sthayi-bhavas*, are themselves pleasurable in nature, a view openly contradicted by the etymology of the word "*bhava*", which in Buddhist and Patanjali parlance, means "life" or "suffering" (See Chs. II and XI). Mm. Kane also nowhere discusses how it is possible for *sthayi-bhavas* to become *Rasas*. He takes it to be axiomatic that stimulated *sthayi-bhavas*, fed on by *vibhavas*, at once pass to the *Rasa* stage.

It may be noted further that Mm. P. V. Kane in p. 354-5, accepts with Bhatta Nayaka that *rasa-swada* is in the same category with *para-brahma-saksatkara*. As *para-brahma* is *ananda-maya*, so is the apprehension of *rasa*. But he never attempts to explain how a pleasure which belongs primarily to the *laukika* plane, becomes transformed into an *aprakrita*!

nature (see Chs. IV and V). He has again very little to say on how the sthayī-bhavas are stimulated by vibhava (see Ch. II), or on how the stimulated sthayī-bhavas pass on to the rasa stage (see Chs. X and XI), or on how the purified prakṛita sattva comes to reflect the aprakṛita viśuddha sattva (see Chs. XI and XII), which is of the nature of Brahman Himself. It is difficult to accept further Mm. P. V. Kane's view that "the Sāṃkhya philosophy had not much influence over 'ālamkāra', in face of Bharata's deep indebtedness to Patañjali-Cārika (see Chs. II, IV, VII, VIII, IX, X).

Mm. P. V. Kane also nowhere discusses what according to him is the nature of aesthetic enjoyment. He simply refers to Bharata (G.O.S.) vol. I, ch. vi, pp. 288-291, where the Muṇi explains why this aesthetic pleasure is called rasa. "Just as persons who partake of food, prepared with many condiments (such as jaggery, curds, cardamom, camphor, mārka), taste many flavours and feel pleasure and delight, so spectators relish sthayī-bhavas, suggested by various bhavas, acting, recitation, etc., and enjoy delight, and therefore are called natya-rasas. The word, rasa, in ordinary life has many senses, viz. "mercury, sweetness and other flavours, essence, strong liking, decoction, exuded juice, one of the bodily dhātus" (Abhinava-bharatī vol. I. p. 289), but in kavya and natya, it has another meaning derived by metaphor from the idea of tasting or relishing". The foregoing statement of Abhinavagupta is full of suggestion, the complete significance of which is not clear to many people. In the first part of his statement, Abhinavagupta by referring to the preparation of food with many condiments, was obviously thinking of the place of Sakti in Rasa enjoyment (See Ch. II, and Ch. IV). Abhinavagupta's reference to the different meanings of Rasa, seems to indicate the deep embrace of sabda and artha (See Ch. I, sec. III), as also his awareness of the physiological basis of Bharata's Rasa speculations. But Mm. P. V. Kane does not look beyond what is immediately before him; and Abhinavagupta's statement is interpreted in a way, which is not compatible with the main tenets of his philosophy.

This brings one to the consideration of what according to Mm. P. V. Kane is the nature of aesthetic enjoyment. The present writer has proved by overwhelming evidence that the bliss of aesthetic enjoyment is always of the nature of an ideal balance or samata. This position is held in Sāṃkhya-

Patanjala, Mahayana and Hinayana systems, the Tantras, as also in the Bhagavad-Gita (see ch. IX). This standpoint offers a complete explanation of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment. But it should be noted that nowhere in his "History of Sanskrit Poetics", Mm. P. V. Kane takes any note of this standpoint in Rasa analysis.

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta generally agrees with Mm. P. V. Kane in his analysis of Bharata's exposition of Rasa theory. In pp. 592-604 of "History of Sanskrit Literature" (Calcutta University, 1947), he sketches the outlines of the theory of Rasa. "We must start the theory of rasa, or aesthetic emotion with Bharata's maxim, vibhavanubhava-vyabhlhari-samyogad rasa-nlspatth. The meaning of this line has been a subject of much discussion . . . . Bhamaha was also acquainted with rasa, as he speaks of Kavya-rasa, with which as a first startling people are to be tempted to study the scriptures. . . . . In the general sense, rasa means taste, rasamaya means tasty, while in the technical sense, it means the well-known dominant emotions, such as the amorous, the ludicrous, the pathetic, the passionate, the heroic, the wonder-producing, the fearful and the repugnant". But Dr. Das Gupta takes no note of how it is that the same word, rasa, is used in speculations of both Alamkara and the Ayurveda (See Chs. I and III), or that there must be a common ground of agreement between certain mental and bodily states, which made it possible for both being called rasas.

In his Kavya-vicara (1939), p. 89, Dr. Das Gupta refers to the paucity of materials, available in Bharata for a full discussion of the theory of Rasa. In his article on the "Theory of Rasa" in "History of Sanskrit Literature" (Calcutta University), p. 594, he overlooks the gulf of time which separates Abhinavagupta from Bharata, and writes, "the real discussion of rasa was started by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on Bharata's maxim of rasa". The attempts to read Bharata through the spectacles of Abhinavagupta, have resulted in obscuring the true background of the Natya-Sastra, much as the attempted explanation of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines from the standpoint of the Renaissance have led to a very different explanation of certain fundamental concepts, hardly meant by the philosophers themselves.\*

5 A New Interpretation of the doctrine of Katharsis in Aristotle's Poetics—R. Sen (Calcutta Review).

This essay is the first systematic attempt to disengage Bharata's *Natya-Sastra* from the trammels of his commentators (all of whom belong to different philosophic traditions), and re-instate Bharata, and interpret him against the background of his age.

Dr. Das Gupta does not explain the relation of *vibhava* to *rasa* (see Ch. II), or the nature of *sthayi-bhavas* (see Ch. XI), which pass to the *rasa*-stage. He has again very little to say on the nature of aesthetic experience (see Ch. IX), or how *rasa*-realisation is made possible (see Chs. X and XI). It is needless to point out that Dr. Das Gupta is not aware of Bharata's very great debt to *Patanjala-Caraka*, or how deeply has Bharata been influenced by the *Ayurveda* (see Chs. VI, VII and VIII). In all these, the present writer is a pioneer, and breaks absolutely new ground, which will help interpret Indian *rasa* speculations.

Like Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Dr. S. K. De is also fully conscious that Bharata is not the first exponent of *Rasa* theory. In his "History of Sanskrit Poetics" vol. 2, pp. 21-22 he writes, "that the *rasa*-doctrine was older than Bharata is apparent from Bharata's own citation of several verses in the *arya* and *anustubh* metres in support of, or in supplement to his own statements; and in one place, he appears to quote two *arya* verses from an unknown work on *rasa*". Dr. De goes on to write. "The idea of *rasa*, apart from any theory thereon, was naturally not known to old writers; and Bharata's treatment would indicate that some system of *rasa*, however undeveloped, or even a *Rasa* school, particularly in connection with the drama, must have been in existence in his time . . . . The comparative antiquity of such a *rasa* system in connection with the drama, going back to a time, even earlier than Bharata, cannot be doubted".

But Dr. De is hardly aware that Bharata was not so much drawing upon such an imaginary dramaturgic *rasa* system, as he was drawing upon the living, contemporary *rasa*-speculations of *Patanjala-Caraka*. He shares the popular view that Bharata's work is a crude beginning, and writes, "With Bharata, therefore, we arrive at a distinctly definite landmark of the *rasa*-doctrine". This definitiveness with Dr. De means little else than a starting point. He does not visualise what may be the sources and origin of this starting point, or the proper background of the concept of *rasa*.

In pp. 24-25, Dr. De speaks of how "Bharata himself, like all old masters is tantalisingly simple in his statements; for the subject does not appear to have yet been brought into the realm of scholastic speculation". This clearly indicates that according to Dr. De, Bharata's Rasa speculations have no philosophic foundations, a contention which is refuted throughout this thesis. It will be seen on the other hand, that Bharata sums up a rich philosophic tradition, without a study of which Bharata's Rasa speculations can never be adequately understood.

Coming to the question of Rasa-realisation, and the nature of aesthetic enjoyment, it will be seen that Dr. De has little to say on these very important problems. He repeatedly says (pp. 24, 29, 31) that little can be gathered from the somewhat meagre text of Bharata. He admits on p. 32 that "of the period anterior to Bharata, our knowledge is extremely scanty." The only possible background of Bharata's Rasa-system is, according to Dr. De, the dramaturgic Rasa speculations. On p. 23 he writes, "As Dramaturgy was in the beginning a separate study, from which Poetics itself probably took its cue, the Rasa doctrine, which sprang up chiefly in connection with this study, confined its activity in the first stage of its development to the sphere of dramatic composition and exerted only a limited influence on poetic theories. The importance of this dramaturgic rasa-system must have been somewhat overshadowed by the early dominance, in Poetics proper, of the Alamkara and Riti systems, whose traditions are carried on by two earliest writers on Poetics, Bhamaha and Dandin, both of whom allow a very subsidiary place to rasa in their scheme".

Dr. De's differentiation of natya-rasa from kavya-rasa seems to be arbitrary, and there is no point in "taking into account Bharata's doctrine of natya-rasa as the original source of the doctrine of kavya-rasa, elaborated in later Poetics". The more important question is what is the original source of both natya-rasa and kavya-rasa, which do not differ qualitatively, but do so only in extent and range.<sup>6</sup> It is felt that it is needless to foist upon a hypothetical dramaturgic

rasa-system the rasa-speculations of Bharata. It is much better to read Bharata against his proper philosophic background. An intelligible explanation of the doctrine of Rasa is only possible by reading Bharata like this.

In pages 25-27, of his "History of Sanskrit Poetics" vol. 2, Dr. De gives an account of the accepted view of Rasa. "Although Bharata does not enter into technicalities, he seems to be of opinion that the vibhavas and anubhavas which later theory takes to be essential factors, call forth or evoke rasa; but he is not clear as to what this process of evolution exactly is. He takes bhava as the basis of rasa, and explains it generally as that which brings into existence the sense of poetry, through the three kinds of representation". Dr. De again writes, "Nothing definite can be concluded from all this except that, in Bharata's opinion, the sthayi-bhava or the principal mood in a composition is the basis of rasa, the essence of which consists in *asvada* or relish by the reader or spectator, while the vibhava, anubhava and the vyabhicharibhava awaken this state of emotional realisation or "relish" in the reader's mind".

"The original outlines of the theory, however, are accepted as fixed by Bharata". But Dr. De, excepting the enumeration of the different constituents of rasa, has little to say on the background of the concept of rasa. He repeats the accepted view that sthayi-bhavas are transmuted into rasas. But he has nothing to say how this transmutation is effected in poetry and drama. A detailed analysis of this question will be made in Ch. XI of the present dissertation, where for the first time, an explanation is offered of how it is that bhava, which is not free from rajas and tamas (see Chs. II and XI) is raised to the Rasa stage. Speaking of sthayi-bhavas, Dr. De writes, "By the sthayi-bhava in poetry and drama are meant certain more or less permanent mental states, such as Love, Grief, Anger or Fear. This permanent mood, constituting the principal theme of a composition, and running through all other moods like the thread of a garland, cannot be overcome by those akin to it, or those opposed to it, but can only be reinforced. These elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the sthayi-bhavas, are in poetry and drama, known as vibhava, anubhava and vyabhicharibhava, corresponding in ordinary life (as opposed to the extra-ordinary



world of poetry) to the mundane causes and effects (laukika-kāraṇa and kārya)".

Dr. De makes the bare statement that the *sthayi-bhava*, when accompanied with *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhichari-bhava*, passes to the *rasa* stage. It will be seen that starting with *sthayi-bhava*, there are four distinct stages, culminating in *Rasa*. It is absolutely necessary that for a proper understanding of the theory of *Rasa*, each of these four stages should be analysed in detail. When such a detailed investigation is carried out, as has been done in the present thesis, it will be seen that these investigations clearly point to the proper background of *Rasa*. Such an investigation in the case of *vibhava* has been made in Ch. II; in the case of *sattvika bhavas* in Ch. VII; and in the case of *vyabhichari-bhavas* in Ch. VIII. The analysis of the physical characteristics of both *sarira* and *manasa rasas* is made in Ch. II, and the *sthayi-bhava* itself has been analysed in Ch. XI. All these unmistakably point to the philosophic traditions of *Patanjala-Caraka*, *Hinayana* and *Mahayana Buddhism*, and the *Tantras* as the proper background of *Bharata's Natya-Sastra* (vide Appendix I).

The foregoing analysis of the exposition of *Rasa* theory by Dr. Das Gupta, Mm. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. K. De, raises a very strong presumption that *Bharata's Natya-Sastra* requires much fuller study by subsequent scholars; and *Abhinavagupta's* brilliant commentary on it has blinded his admirers as to the true significance of *Bharata's Natya-Sastra*. This is particularly so, because *Abhinavagupta* belongs to a very different philosophical tradition from his master, *Bharata*. It shall be seen in Ch. IX how *Abhinavagupta's* analysis of *Rasa* offers a complete and consistent account of this much discussed problem in aesthetics. But this is no reason why *Bharata's* own characteristic utterances and philosophic position should be overlooked, and *Bharata* himself should be looked upon as "tantalisingly simple" (De), ignoring his rich philosophical background. The task of the present writer has been complicated by long-continued neglect in recognising the background of *Bharata's Natya-Sastra*, and the continued efforts at reading *Bharata*, divorced and isolated from all philosophical questions, and his background in *Ayurvedic* speculations on *Rasa* (vide Chs. II, VI, VII, VIII).

All attempts to read Bharata through the spectacles of Abhinavagupta, are thus fraught with great dangers, leading to the obscuring of the parent text. The present thesis is the first serious and systematic attempt to disengage Bharata from the trammels of his commentators, and is an analysis of what Bharata himself stood for. In disengaging Bharata from his commentators and expositors, great reliance has naturally been placed on the philosophic background of the age, to which Bharata belonged.

The period of philosophic integration to which Bharata belonged is the Epic period (600 B.C.—200 A.D.), accepting the four-fold division of Indian philosophy, as suggested by Dr. Radhakrishnan (See Sec. II). The dominating thought of this age is, as has been already noted, the concept of *visuddhi*, an idea which gives the clue to the essence of aesthetic enjoyment. Speaking of the common ideas, shared by all six systems of philosophy, Dr. Radhakrishnan says that these are acceptance of the validity of the Vedas, a protest against the scepticism of the Buddhists, and recognition of the great world rhythm. Other common traits shared by many schools are the concept of *jivan-mukti*. Indian philosophy recognises as obligatory unselfish love and disinterested activity, and insist on *citta-suddhi* (cleansing of the heart) as essential to all moral culture (Indian Philosophy, vol. II. Introduction, pp. 25-27).

It will be seen that Bharata acknowledges the validity of the Vedas (see Ch. VI), but does not protest like other Hindu systems, against Buddhism. Bharata's analysis of the concept of *visuddha-sattva* is very close to the analysis of *visuddhi* in the *Seko-desa-tika* (G.O.S.) (See Ch. IV). His analysis of the essence of aesthetic enjoyment is strikingly similar to the analysis of *Yuganaddha* and *Prajnopaya* in Buddhism (See Ch. IX). All these clearly indicate that the sources of Bharata's inspiration were not as antagonistic and hostile to Buddhism, as other orthodox Hindu systems are. It is well known that of all six orthodox Hindu systems, Patanjala is the least hostile to Buddhism. Indeed, there are traces in the *Yoga-sutra*, *Kaivalya-pada*, which misled certain European scholars into thinking that this last section was a later addition (See Ch. VI). This explains how it is possible for Bharata, being a disciple of Patanjala-Caraka,

to draw upon both Hindu and Buddhist sources (See Chs. II, IV, V, IX and X).

The age of Patanjala represents the great spring-tide of philosophic spirit in India. It is to this period, as noted by Dr. Radhakrishnan, that the religious systems of Buddhism, Jainism, Saivism and Vaishnavism belong (See Introduction Sec. II). Bharata who stands at the end of this Epic period, naturally imbibed the ideas of his age; and attempts to read Bharata, without taking into consideration the influence which his age exercised on him, are sure to mislead and misinterpret the *Natya-Sastra*.

The present writer claims to be the first to make a systematic attempt to read Bharata's *Rasa*-speculations against the background of his age. There is more point in studying Bharata's *Rasa*-speculations, than those of any other, for the simple reason that Bharata being the father and the originator of *Rasa* theory in *Alamkara*, has left a deep impress on all later speculations. It will be necessary to reconsider the whole question of *Rasa*, when Bharata is looked upon not as an isolated phenomenon, but as the representative and spokesman of his age. In pursuing this search of the background of Bharata's *Rasa*-speculations, it has been found necessary to set aside the theory of *Alamkara Rasa*, (*rasaavad alamkara*), as suggested by Dr. Das Gupta, or the theory of *dramaturgic rasa* as suggested by Dr. De, or again the theory of *rasavad alamkara*, as emphasized by Mm. P. V. Kane (*History of Sanskrit Poetics*. 1951, p. 341), as the source of Bharata's *Rasa*.

#### IV

There is another very weighty consideration, which makes it necessary to re-open the question of *Rasa*-realisation in *Alamkara*. Most writers on *Rasa* (including Dr. Das Gupta, Mm. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. K. De) look at *Rasa*-speculation as a distinct branch of study, and reserve for it a high place, aloof from all physical speculations. But it is felt that this attitude goes against the fundamental teachings of both Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. In the early comprehensive vision of the Hindus and the Buddhists.

there was no sharp differentiation between body and mind, between nama and rupa, or between the physical and the psychical plane. The modern reader, very largely under the influence of Descartes, has learnt to look at body and mind as two distinct and separate entities. This attitude which is nowhere to be met in early Indian speculations, has made it impossible for the modern reader to appreciate the true significance of Bharata.

In the integrated and comprehensive outlook of the ancient Hindus, both body and mind appeared to be under the operations of the same laws. They are not exclusive of each other, but one is being invariably influenced by the other. It was easier for one, brought upon the traditions of Patanjala, to speak of mental operations, like bhava and rasa, purely in terms of bodily experience. Bharata has extensively borrowed from both the Yoga-sutra (see Chs. VIII, and XI), and the Caraka-Samhita (see Chs. II, VI, VII, VIII and IX), simply because he suffered from no such inhibition, which looks at body and mind as utterly distinct entities.

It will be seen in Ch. II, how Bharata, like Caraka-Patanjala and Abhidhamma speculations, looks at sabda and rupa in the form of vibhavas as ahara. It will be noted further that this position is exactly parallel to the ahara, taken in by the mouth, which goes to replenish the supply of bodily rasas. The indriyārtha-indriya-samyoga which is the starting point in the case of both sarira and manasa rasas, provides the common ground on which the speculations of rasa in Ayurveda and Alamkara meet.

It should be noted further that the Samkhya philosophy, as also other systems of Indian thought, have recognised from very early times a direct correspondence between the five jñanendriyas and the five karmendriyas. The five jñanendriyas are caksu, karna, nasa, jivha and tvak, each of them taking in sense impressions as ahara. The analogy of food and drink, so frequently used by alamkarikas from Bharata onward, to describe rasa enjoyment, also emphasizes this aspect of rasa; ahara taken in by jivha on the one hand and caksu and karna on the other, alike contribute to the growth and development of rasa.

The other standpoint, which is implicit throughout Rasa speculations is more significant. It is that each indriyārtha is related not merely to one jñanendriya, but also

to one karmendriya, so that a natural relation is established between a jnanendriya and a karmendriya. The jnanendriya, caksu is related to the karmendriya pada, as the jnanendriya, karna is linked with the karmendriya, vak. So nasa is related to payu, as jivha is to upastha. Tvak naturally goes with pani. Arranged in a tabular form, the above scheme would appear as follows.

Jnanendriya	Caksu	Karna	Nasa	Jivha	Tvak
Indriyārtha	Rupa	Sabda	Gandha	Rasa	Sparsa
Karmendriya	Pada	Vak	Payu	Upastha	Pani

It is not very easy to find corroborative evidence in support of this standpoint. But there is at least enough evidence to show how the jnanendriya, jivha which lies at the root of all bodily rasas in the Ayurveda is intimately related to the karmendriya, upastha. It will be seen in Ch. IX how the upastha is associated with the essence of aesthetic enjoyment in Alamkara. This standpoint anticipates by more than two thousand years the recent findings of Sigmund Freud, that all mental emotions and complexes are of a sexual nature. The Indian standpoint on this particular question has been discussed in detail in Ch. IX, where it has been found that Rasa enjoyment proceeds out of an ideal samata, which transcends both masculinity and femininity in human nature.

Caraka holds that the jnanendriya, caksu is intimately associated with the karmendriya, pada. In Sutra-sthanam. 5. 32, Caraka writes,

... .. पादाभ्यंगनिषेवनात् ।

जायते सौकुमार्यं च वलं स्यैर्यं च पादयोः ।

दृष्टिः प्रसादं लभते... ..\*॥(1)

Mahamahopadhyaya Gangadhara Kaviraja commenting on this, writes, dristiprasadam labhate, ityārtha tantratare hetu-rucyata. "caksusi prati-baddhe dve sire pada-gate nrinam. Atas-caksu prasadarthee—padabhyangam sama-caret". So jnanendriya caksu and karmendriya, pada go together.

Just as this is true of caksu and pada, so also it is true of karna and vak. The indriyārtha of the jnanendriya, karna is sabda. This sabda is produced by the karmendriya, vak. It is easy to see how the jnanendriya, karna naturally goes

with the karmendriya, vak, because the indriyārtha which brings these two together, is the same, namely sabda.

So there seems to be a natural affinity between the jñanendriya tvak and the karmendriya, paṇi. The seat of the karmendriya, paṇi is the hand, the mouth and the beak or the lips. All these are intimately associated with the jñanendriya, tvak. Caraka in Sūtra-sthānam. 5. 28-30, speaks of how regular taking-in of gulps of oil in the mouth improves the complexion, and makes the skin beautiful. Caraka writes,

नित्यं स्रेहाद् शिरसः शिरःशूलं न जायते ।

न स्नातित्यं न पालित्यं न केशाः प्रपतन्ति च ॥ (2)

The karmendriya, paṇi and jñanendriya, tvak, being both of them dependent on the mouth, are naturally related to each other.

The affinity between the jñanendriya, jivha or rasana and the karmendriya, upastha is of immediate importance to the present dissertation on Rasa. The particular provinces of these two speculations about Rasa in Alamkāra and Ayurveda, seem remote from each other, having little in common between them. It may be noted that while Rasa in Ayurveda is exclusively dependent on ahara (see Ch. II), Rasa in Alamkāra is purely on the psychical plane and is of the nature of Bliss itself. It will be seen that this Bliss or ananda is essentially the result of the achievement of an ideal samata (Ch. IX), between all the contending elements which undermine human personality. An epitome of this ideal bliss is granted to man in the form of sexual union, where man finds his fulfilment in his counterpart, woman (Ch. IX). In holding that Rasa in Ayurveda is the source and origin of Rasa in Alamkāra, Bharata was only re-emphasizing the traditional position, that the jñanendriya, jivha and the karmendriya, upastha are intimately related with each other.

There is ample evidence in ancient literature to show that the Hindus had clearly recognised the validity of the position that jivha and upastha always go together. Caraka speaks in Cikitsa-sthānam 2., of the different kinds of food and drink, taken in by the mouth, which improve the virility of the male. In the same chapter, Caraka discusses the

necessity of taking in rich meals, if a man is to enjoy prolonged sexual intercourse with his wife.

The intimate relationship between the jnanendriya, rasana and the karmendriya, upastha has been referred to again and again in the Srimad Bhagavad. There is much reason to believe that Bharata was fully aware of this position, when he compared rasa-realisation in kavya and nataka as being of the same nature as food and drink, tasted by the tongue. The Srimad Bhagavad in Skandha. 7. ch. 6. sloka 3, speaks of this intimate relationship between the jnanendriya, jivha and the karmendriya, upastha. The Bhagavad writes,

उपस्थ-जैह्वयं बहु मन्यमानः ।

कथं विराज्यते दुरन्तमोहः ॥

"How can one, who thinks highly of the pleasures of the sex and of the palate, get over these addictions?" The Srimad Bhagavad in Skandha 7. ch. 15 sloka 18, is even more specific. The sloka reads like this.

Santusta kena ba rajan na vartetapi barina

Aupasthya-jaihvya-karpnyad-griha-palayate jana.

The Bhagavad means by this that man lives in the world. His body and mind are both contented, like those of a dog. The pleasures of the body are derived through pleasant food and drink, tasted by the rasana; the pleasures of the mind are through sexual intercourse, and the attendant enjoyment. It should be noted further that whatever pleases the palate is a rasayana, and a very good stimulant of the sexual urge.

There are traces in the extant Natya-Sastra, which clearly indicate that Bharata must have been fully aware of this subsisting relation between jivha and upastha, or pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind. The famous analogy of food and drink, to which Bharata refers in the course of his exposition of Rasa-theory in ch. 6 has got three important aspects, all very important for an adequate understanding of Rasa. But not one of these aspects has been taken any note of by Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, or Mm. P. V. Kane, or by Dr. S. K. De. The three stand-points from which this very famous analogy can be looked at are first how it is that Bharata speaks of the pleasures of the palate in connection with mental emotions. Why Bharata should have compared psychical Rasa to physical Rasa, and

drawn extensively on the Ayurvedic speculations, should at once become clear from the above consideration.

The second standpoint implicit in Bharata's analogy has been worked out at length in Ch. II. It is the standpoint of ahara. It has been found that Rasa of the body and Rasa of the mind, being both dependent on ahara, have a natural affinity between them.

The third standpoint, implicit once again in the analogy, is the concept of sakti; and this has been worked out at length in Chapter I. This is again the concept of *visuddha-sattva*, fully developed in Chs. IV and V. So starting from the analogy used by Bharata to explain the nature of Rasa-enjoyment, it will be seen how all these three distinct standpoints are implicit in Bharata's short and cryptic statement. These once again lead to the final analysis of the philosophy of aesthetic enjoyment in Chs. IX, X and XI.

It will be noticed after a careful study of the present work, that the scope of this thesis is very different from the standard works on the subject, by such eminent scholars, like Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Mm. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De, and Dr. V. Raghavan. While the merits of their work are undeniable, it has been felt that their approach is exclusive, cut off from the main trends of Bharata's times. The present study is not opposed to what they have to say on the field of their specialised investigations. It is on the other hand, complementary to their studies, bringing in new materials, standpoints, all of which are noticed for the first time here. In thus widening and broadening the scope of investigations, the author has principally depended on the integrated philosophic thought of the age of Bharata. It is hoped that these supplementary studies will shed significant light on one of the most discussed topics in Indian Alamkara, and necessitate the reconsideration of the background of the concept of Rasa.



## CHAPTER I

### *Myth and Reality: Experience and Speculative thought*

The study of the evolution and development of concepts is highly interesting. This is particularly so, because concepts far from being static, are dynamic and go on developing through the ages. A good deal of the misinterpretation of concepts and ideas is to be accounted for by their being taken as fixed and stationary entities. It is possible to look at any concept whether in art and literature, or in religion and philosophy, from two distinct standpoints. In most cases, these two standpoints are very different. It is because the history of the evolution of many concepts is shrouded in mystery. Much useful work is being done to-day towards the unravelling of the mysterious beginnings of certain concepts, which have dominated the thought of primitive man. The first standpoint might be called the historical standpoint. This is the standpoint of *tathya*. Certain primitive ideas, facts of everyday experience, superstitions and beliefs, codes of conduct and ways of life are uppermost in the minds of the common man. These elements are the first to appear in the social life of the people. The superstructure of philosophic thought of a later date, is built on the foundations provided by these speculations of primitive man, and furnishes the standpoint of *tattva*. It is an attempted rationalisation of everyday experience. In most cases, experience and philosophic thought are so inextricably mixed up, that it is almost impossible to separate one from the other.

Speculation—as the etymology of the word shows—is an intuitive mode of apprehension. This does not mean, of course, that it is mere irresponsible meandering of the mind, which ignores reality, or seeks to escape from its problems. Speculative thought—or the standpoint of *tattva*—transcends experience, but only because it attempts to explain, to unify, to order experience. It achieves this end by means of hypothesis. If the original sense of the word be remembered it will be seen that speculative thought attempts to underpin the chaos of experience, so that it may

reveal the features of a structure—order, coherence and meaning.

Speculative thought and the subject-matter of the present dissertation is the exploration of the background of Rasa speculations—is therefore distinct from mere idle speculation in that it never breaks entirely away from experience. It may be "once removed" from the problems of experience, but it is connected with them in that it tries to explain them. The greatest handicap from which most of the later writers on Rasa speculations seem to suffer, is that they have completely lost sight of the bases of speculations in facts and experience. Their speculations have become more and more scholarly, while the speculative thought of early writers on Rasa, was not remote, but firmly rooted in concrete experience.

Speculation has its place in the scheme and pattern of philosophy. But without the facts of experience before it, it becomes remote, a useless toy. Again, experience, if it be not studied in the light of mature wisdom, loses all its significance, and becomes chaotic. It is useless to examine which standpoint is more important, the standpoint of tathya, or experience, and the standpoint of tattva, or philosophic thought. It is necessary that for the complete understanding of any concept, it should be studied from both these standpoints. The analysis of the sources and origin of a particular concept is as important as the philosophic interpretation of it, made necessary by maturer thought. An attempt has been made in the present study, to find out the historical background of the concept of Rasa, as also to arrive at an intelligent philosophic interpretation of it.

## I

It is possible to arrive at an intelligent explanation of certain gods and goddesses, if it be remembered that they are also the result of a happy blending of facts of ordinary experience, and philosophic interpretation and speculation. Different stories about the goddess Laksmi, are told in the Puranas. It is said that the Lord Manu had married the goddess, Satarupa, the daughter of Rudra. Two sons, Priyabrata and Uttanapada, and two daughters, Prasuti and

Akuti were born to this goddess, Satarupa. Daksa married Prasuti and had twenty-four daughters born to him by Prasuti. Out of these twenty-four daughters, thirteen including Laksmi were given in marriage to Dharma. The other eleven were married to Bhrigu, Bhava, Marici and eight others (Visnu-Purana, 1. 7. 14-26; Padma-Purana Srlsti-Khanda, 3. 183). Laksmi gave birth to a son, Darpa. The Visnu-Purana notes further, that Bhrigu had two sons, Dhata and Vidhata, and a daughter, Laksmi by his wife Khyati. Laksmi, the daughter of Bhrigu, was married to Lord Narayana. It follows from both these accounts that Laksmi is either the daughter of Daksa by Prasuti, or the daughter of Bhrigu by Khyati.

The Puranas again speak of the appearance of Laksmi from the ocean. The sage, Durbasa begged a divine garland from a Vidyadhari; it was granted to him by Lord Indra. This garland, symbolical of Laksmi, was slighted by Indra. Durbasa cursed Indra that his residence, Trailokya, the three worlds, would be without Laksmi (pranasta—laksmika). The triloka, being thus without Laksmi, the gods became enfeebled, and were routed by the asuras, and banished from the heaven. The gods with Brahma, worshipped Lord Visnu. Lord Visnu advised them to churn the ocean. Goddess Lakshmi came out of the ocean, as a result of this churning. The sages worshipped the goddess, muttering Sree-sukta; the gandharvas sang in chorus; the apsaras like Ghrtaci danced; the river, Ganges came and attended on her; the elephants (=dig-gaja) took up golden vessels, and bathed the goddess by pouring fragrant waters; the Lord of the sea gave her a garland, which never fades; and the Lord Viswakarma himself fashioned the ornaments for her. The goddess, thus decorated and delicately perfumed, took her seat in the breast of Visnu.

The Puranas attempt a reconciliation of the stories of the appearance of Laksmi from the ocean, and of her being the daughter of Bhrigu and Daksa. The Puranas hold that the appearance of Laksmi as the daughter of Bhrigu or of Daksa, is her second appearance. The Visnu-Purana definitely holds that just as the Lord of Lords, Janardana repeatedly appears in the forms of avatars, so also does his consort, Laksmi. When Hari became Aditya, then Laksmi appeared again from the lotus; she is Sita, when He is

Raghava; She is Ruksmīni when He is Kṛṣṇa. She assumes a divine shape when Her Lord is divine. She is of this world, when Her Lord is one of flesh and blood (Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, 1. 9).

It must have been noted further that the Purāṇas very often describe Lakṣmī in a way, which shows a clear deference to popular sentiments. There is little or no attempt to rationalise such descriptions in the light of philosophic speculation, or tattva. The Purāṇas give expression to popular sentiments in beautiful poetry. The Brahma-valvarta-Purāṇa writes that the Śakti in Mūla-prakṛiti, one who is of the nature of Suddha-sattva (See Chs. IV and V), is the consort of Lord Viṣṇu. She is Lakṣmī. She is the goddess of wealth. She is beautiful, calm and quiet, benefactress of mankind, and without any greed or stupor, anger or desire. She loves those who are devoted to their husband. She herself is devoted to Her Lord. She is the beginning of all things; she is the source of love and delight; she speaks kindly, and is an ideal wife. She represents the fertility of the earth (See also ch. VI), and as such, she is the life of all living beings. She is Mahā-lakṣmī. In Vālkuntha, she serves Viṣṇu; in Swarga, she is Swargā-lakṣmī. She is the Rājā-lakṣmī in the king's palace. She is Gṛihā-lakṣmī in every household. She is like the Sōbhā of everything. She is the splendour of the king. She is like the wealth and merchandise of the merchant (Brahma-valvarta, Prakṛiti-khaṇḍa, I. 22-30). The description of Lakṣmī at one stage in the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa may not have much philosophical importance, or tattva. But it shows great awareness and sensitiveness of the world of reality, or tathya. It is said that Goddess Sree is the universal mother (Brahma-valvarta, I. 8. 15-32), and does not change. She is all-pervasive like Her Lord. Viṣṇu is artha, she is baṇī; Viṣṇu is naya, she is nīti. Viṣṇu is bodha, she is buddhi; Viṣṇu is dharma, she is sat-kṛiyā. Viṣṇu is sṛasta, she is sṛiṣṭi. He is bhu-dhara; she is bhūmi; The Lord is kama; she is iccha. Viṣṇu is yagna; she is daksina. Lakṣmī is idhya, the Lord is kusa. The Lord is sāmā, she is the tune; Lakṣmī is swaha, Vasudeva is the sacrificial fire. The Lord is Sankara, she is Gaurī; Kesava is the sun, she is His rays. Govinda is the ocean, Sree is the shore; Lakṣmī is jyotsna, Hari is the lamp. The universal Mother, Sree is the creeper,

the universal Lord is the tree. Sree is night, the Lord is day. The Lord is the husband, the goddess is His bride. The Lord is Raga, She is Rati. It is in this way, that popular imagination saw in Hari the personification of the male element, and in Laksmi, the emblem of womanhood (Brahma-vaivarta I. 8. 15.32).

Looked at from the standpoint of tattva, or philosophic speculation, it will be seen that all the Puranas attempt a harmonisation of conflicting tendencies, and arrive at a unified vision of reality. This unification in the case of Radha is more of a popular nature, showing little awareness of a deep rooted philosophical conviction. In the history of Indian religious thought, such systematic thinking, leading to a harmonisation between different speculations about the nature of reality, is to be met with in the Bhagavat Gita. The Purusattoma-vada of the Bhagavat Gita manifests itself in its various forms in the Puranas. It appears that from the standpoint of tattva, there is not much of difference in the Vasudeva tattva of the Panca-ratra, or the Parama Sivattva of the Kasmir Saivism, or the Bhagavad-tattva in the Puranas, or again the Purusattamo-tattva, discussed in the Bhagavat Gita. It is difficult to say if there had been any common origin or starting-point of all these speculations. It is the standpoint of tattva, attempting to harmonise the conflicting view-points in the world of tathya.

## II

If it be true of Laksmi and Narayana, it is no less true of the concept of other gods like Indra or Siva. In the evolution of the concept of such gods or goddesses, experience of the facts in daily life has got inextricably mixed up with speculations of a later date, so that it is difficult to distinguish between speculation and reality. The Vedas unquestionably acknowledge the supremacy of the Lord Indra. Different rsis have composed many hymns in praise of Indra in different ages. Some of the hymns to Lord Indra in the Rg-veda are pretty old, some again are comparatively modern. Lord Indra is the chief deity in the Rg-veda. He has been universally associated with the onset of rains from

very early times. This analysis of the evolution of the concept of Indra from what was originally a form of nature-worship, seems to have left its trace on Bharata's *Natya-sastra*. It will be remembered that plays could only be staged by first invoking Lord Indra.

Coming to the analysis of the concept of Indra, or Indra-tattva, it will be seen that the ancient Hindus saw in every natural phenomenon, the manifestation of its presiding deity. There is such a presiding deity for *vayu*, *agni*, *jala* or *akasa* as also of *prithvi*. There is little agreement among scholars about what gods are the presiding deities of which particular natural force or phenomenon. In explaining the nature of the Vedic gods, some have emphasized the astronomical phenomenon in the distant skies; some again, have given prominence to clouds, rains, lightning and thunder, and other natural phenomena as underlying the concepts of different gods and deities. Max Muller thinks that sun-rise and sun-set, daily rotation of the earth, leading to day and night, and such other phenomena lie at the background of most mythology. The theology of the Vedas is to be explained from the standpoint of Vedic mythology. Prof. Wuhn, on the other hand, has emphasized the importance of such natural phenomena, as the rising of the clouds, the flashing of lightning, peals of thunder and blowing of storms in his interpretation of the Vedic deities (*Science of Language*—Max Muller, 1882, vol. II, pp.565-566). Prof. Keith in his "*Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanishads*" (1925) holds a similar view that the origin of Lord Indra can be explained, when it is remembered how very important were such natural phenomena as rains and lightning to primitive man.

The *Rg-veda* enjoins worship of *Mitra*, *Varuna* and *Dyava-Prithvi* as personified deities and imagines the presence of a living spirit, permeating all nature. It became an instinct with primitive men, to offer homage to these deities, presiding over all natural phenomena. Discussing the philosophical basis of the Vedic-gods, Max Muller writes, "The Vedic poets spoke not only of rain (*Indu*), but of a rainer (*Indra*), not only of fire and light as a fact, but of a lighter and burner, an agent of fire and light, a *Dyaus* (*Zeus*) and an *Agni* (*ignis*). It seemed impossible to them that sun and moon should rise every day, should

grow strong and weak again every month or every year, unless there was an agent behind who controlled them . . . . The process on which originally all gods depended for their very existence, the personification of, or the activity attributed to the great natural phenomena, while more or less obscured in all other religions, takes place in the Rig-veda, as it were in the full light of day. The gods of the Vedic, and indirectly of all the Aryan people, were the agents postulated behind the great phenomena of nature.\*

This is the factual, material background in tathya of the great gods in the Vedas. In "A General Index to the Names and Subject-Matter of the Sacred Books of the East", compiled by M. Winternitz, and edited by Max Muller (Oxford, 1910), the factual basis or the tathya of the evolution of the Vedic Gods, is again discussed at length. Of the deities, indexed in the book, Agni and many others are discussed from several standpoints. In Sec.(e), Max Muller discusses the anthropomorphic conception of Agni (his body, his food and drink, his chariot and horses, his wives and children). In Sec. (f), he discusses the theriomorphic conception of Agni, and his relations to animals. Both positions, the anthropomorphic and the theriomorphic conceptions are from the standpoint of tathya. Of the numerous references to the anthropomorphic and the theriomorphic conception of Agni (and Agni is not an isolated case), only a few may be referred to here. The bricks of the fire-altar are the limbs of Agni. vol. 41.<sup>2</sup> p. 156; Agni has three heads and seven rays (or reins). vol. 46. p. 167, 168; he has got many faces (the fires). vol. 46. p. 103, 248, 280; the face of Agni is turned everywhere. vol. 46. p. 125; Agni eats with his sharp jaws, he chews, he throws down the forests, shears the hair of the earth. vol. 46. p. 54, 61, 129, 173; and there are many more references to the anthropomorphic conception of Agni. The theriomorphic conception of Agni and his relations to other animals occupy an equally important part in the speculations of the Hindus. Agni is an animal, vol. 41. p. 342, 361, 363, 399, etc., Agni shakes his horns, like a terrible beast. vol. 46 p. 142. Agni is the strong bull, or vrishan,

\* Six systems of Indian Philosophy—Longmans, Green and Co. (1916)

<sup>2</sup> Sacred Books of the East.

vol. 32. p. 144, 146; vol. 46. p. 137, 142, 147, 167. It must have been noticed that in whichever way one looks at the origin and development of the Vedic deities, anthropomorphic or theriomorphic, there is a background of these deities in facts of ordinary experience. This passage from the physical to the metaphysical, from the material to the spiritual, from the world of experience to the ruling principle governing it, is a characteristic trait of the Indian mind. This standpoint is of great significance in understanding how in *Rasa* speculations, concepts which are purely physical and physiological in origin, were transferred to the metaphysical and psychical plane.

But if the interpretations of the Vedas by Prof. Macdonell and Prof. Keith are to be accepted, it would mean that the ancient Hindus were out and out, animists. The Hindus on the other hand, were hardly believers in large natural phenomena, without any divine superimposition. The sun worship of the ancient Hindus is not merely the worship of the largest visible phenomenon before them. But there was the imposition from very early times, on the lifeless matter of the sun, the spirit and impulse of the living god, Vivasvan. The Hindus distinguished between worship of dead matter and worship of the presiding deity. The sun-god in the ancient sun-temples, has been conceived as one, clad in golden harness, with sandals, as in the case of Greek god, Apollo. It shows clearly that there was the necessity even in early times, of the recognition of a definite form for the presiding god, who himself is invisible. An idol, embodying the excellences of the presiding god, was substituted for the god himself. Gods, representing large natural forces, decayed and were substituted by invisible gods in the speculative imagination of man. Lord Indra, who was in all probability, an emperor of this world was thus transfigured into the King of Heaven, and the earthly empire of *Ilabritavarsa* melted into thin air and was substituted by Heaven. Once the gods become invisible and inaccessible, many qualities came to be attributed to them. The upgrading of different gods from primitive speculations can be explained in this way.

Prof. A. S. Geden writing on the Hindu conception of Nature<sup>3</sup> points out how all nature gods are strongly

<sup>3</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. ed. by Hastings. Vol. IX. p. 229.



anthropomorphic. "Perhaps in no other early religion is the 'natural' element so clearly revealed, or the material origin so little obscured by passing into the divine." Sir S. Radhakrishnan sees the physical origin of most of the Vedic gods. He discusses further how in "the conception of Rta, there is a development from the physical to the divine."<sup>4</sup> Again, "the Maruts are the deifications of the great storms so common in India, when the air is darkened by dust and clouds, when in a moment the trees are stripped of their foliage . . . and the rivers are lashed into foam and fury."<sup>5</sup> Sir S. Radhakrishnan says how with the advancement of thought from "the material to the spiritual, from the physical to the personal"<sup>6</sup>, it was possible to conceive of abstract deities. Rasa-speculation in Indian Alamkara has been looked upon for the last thousand years, as if, it is purely abstract and metaphysical. But abstracting is only intelligible when it is rooted in concrete and substantial basis; and metaphysical analysis is little else than an extension of physical speculations.

In "Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads" (Harvard University Press, 1925) Prof. A. B. Keith discusses at length the evolution of the nature gods and abstract deities. Prof. Keith accepts the broad division of nature gods from the standpoint of (a) anthropomorphism (b) theriomorphism and (c) animalism and abstract deities. On p. 58, Keith writes, "The degree of anthropomorphism exhibited by the Vedic deities is extremely variable. In some cases, the active element is constantly present, and the view taken may be set down as almost animalistic. On p. 59, Prof. Keith analyses the concept of the Vedic god, Indra. Though Indra is "primarily in all probability the thunder-storm, which brings down the rain to earth, one of the greatest of India's natural phenomena", he is "a god who has in considerable measure been emancipated from his connection with the phenomena, which produced the conception." In discussing great aerial gods in ch. 9, Keith gives first place to Indra. In p. 126, Keith writes, "His connection with the sun and the fire suggests his fiery character. But the

<sup>4</sup> Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 88.

<sup>6</sup> Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 89.

myth of the slaying of Vrtra, which is the great deed of the god, is not doubtful in sense. It takes the form of the slaying of the god with the aid of Maruts and of Vishnu, or without their aid, of a serpent which was lying on the mountains, keeping in with its coils the waters of the streams. The flood of the waters flows then swiftly to the sea, and at the same time the light shines forth. The god strikes Vrtra on the back, or smites his face, or pierces his vital parts. In p. 61-2, Prof. Keith arrives at the general conclusion that "most of the Vedic nature deities are normally conceived as anthropomorphic."

Sir S. Radhakrishnan in his analysis of the hymns of the Rg-veda<sup>7</sup> refers to the remark of Lucian. "What are men? Mortal gods. What are gods? Immortal men." Following Max Muller and A. B. Keith, S. Radhakrishnan speaks of Indra as "the god of the atmospheric phenomena, of the blue sky. He is the Indian Zeus."<sup>8</sup> "His naturalistic origin is clear. He is born of waters and the cloud. He wields the thunder-bolt, and conquers darkness. . . . Gradually Indra's connection with the sky and the thunder-storms is forgotten. He becomes the divine spirit, the ruler of all the world and all the creatures . . . . The god of the thunder-storm vanquishing the demons of drought and darkness, becomes the victorious god of battles of the Aryans in their struggles with the natives."

Sir S. Radhakrishnan writes<sup>9</sup> while discussing the theology in the hymns of the Rg-veda,<sup>10</sup> "The religion of the undeveloped man, the world over, has been a kind of anthropomorphism . . . . Naturally we project our own volitional agency and explain phenomena by their spiritual causes. We interpret all things on the analogy of our own nature and posit wills behind physical phenomena . . . . It is a sort of polytheism where striking phenomena of nature, of which India is so full, are deified. . . . He hears the voice of god in the tempest and sees his hand in the stilling of the wave. . . . Naturalism and anthropo-

<sup>7</sup> Indian Philosophy (Allen and Unwin) 1948, Vol. 1, p. 85.

<sup>8</sup> For an analysis of the naturalistic origin of Zeus, see Pre-historic Religion—E. O. James

<sup>9</sup> Indian Philosophy—Vol. 1, p. 73-4.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Raja in his lectures on the Vedas does not fully accept this anthropomorphic interpretation of the Vedic gods.

morphism seem to be the first stages of the Vedic religion."

Looked at from the standpoint of tathya, it is similarly possible to find out the elements, which entered into Mother worship, a cult which spread throughout India. It has been pointed out by a school of anthropologists and sociologists that the cult with all its heterogeneous and theological fabrications may be regarded as a contribution to the complex texture of the Hindu religion and culture, mainly, if not solely, by the pre-Aryans, or the non-Aryan aborigines. They hold that the major portion of what is known to-day, as the Sakti-cult, or the Mother cult of India, developed when the social, cultural and religious admixture among the Aryans and the aboriginal non-Aryans, was almost complete. The Vedic religion, they contend, is characterised by a predominance of the male gods, where mother goddesses may be said to be almost conspicuous by their absence. This, they hold, is mainly due to the prevailing patriarchal system in the Indo-Aryan society. Some again have held that traces of the mother goddess as a consort of the father god (Siva) are found in the Indus Civilisation, by which is the probable pre-Aryan civilisation hypothetically constructed on the finds of Harappa and Mohenjodaro. Accepting this working hypothesis, that there existed at least in some parts of India, a rich pre-Aryan civilisation, it has been suggested that the nucleus of the mother goddess is to be found in female figurines, some supposed to be images of the Earth-goddess, and some the protoform of the later wrathful goddess—Mother Kali. About the supposed Earth-goddess, it has been said, by Sir John Marshall, "Now, it is well known that female statuettes, akin to those from the Indus Valley and Baluchistan have been found in large numbers and over a wide range of countries between Persia and the Aegean, notably in Elan, Mesopotamia, Transcaspia, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, Cyprus, Crete, the Cyclades, Balkans and Egypt". (Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilisation, vol. I. p. 50). The obvious suggestion is that this probable mother goddess of the Indus valley presents no isolated history of Mother worship, but indicates the existence of a widespread religious belief.

It will be hazardous under the existing conditions of our knowledge to assign to that hypothetical non-Aryan civilisation the origin of the Mother Cult of the Indo-

Aryans. Possibly, the matriarchal structure of society had a great deal to do with the development of the religious consciousness and practices, gathering round the Mother Cult. No body will be so orthodox as to refuse recognition of the contribution of the aboriginal and other pre-Aryan races to the development of the Mother Cult of Hindu religion.

From the point of view of the evolution of Mother worship, the most important goddess seems to be the Earth-goddess, who has been invoked as the "Great Mother". It has to be noted that when Mother Earth is invoked or entreated, she is seldom praised alone, but is inseparably related with Father Heaven (Dyaus), yet it has to be admitted that the greatness and grandeur of Mother Earth commanded reverential praises from her sons, with whom the offering of song was real worship. "Great is our Mother Earth" (Rig-veda. I. 168.33) was the exclamation of the Vedic poets. Father Heaven and Mother Earth were invoked to bestow on man a luxuriant growth of crops, food and riches; they were invoked to redeem them from all great sins and also to vouchsafe prosperity, happiness, valour, progeny and longevity. They were entreated to protect the people in war, and it was added, "Let not Mother Earth get angry with us at any time". All motherly feeling, tender affection, generosity of heart and forbearance were attributed to Mother Earth, of whom the poets were proud to be the children, and the vastness, variety, resourcefulness and fertility of Mother Earth find innumerable patterns of expression. A further development of this idea of Mother Earth is to be found in the hymn to the Earth of the Atharva-veda (12.1.1-18), where it is said, "Truth and greatness, the right and the formidable, consecration, penance, Brahmin (Supreme) and sacrifice sustain the Earth; . . . . . She (the Earth) bears the herbs of various potency—let the Earth be spread out for us, be prosperous for us. On her are the ocean, the rivers—the waters; on her all food and plough-fields; on her flourish those that breathe and stir; . . . . . let that Earth grant us all prosperity. The immortal heart of this Earth, covered with truth, is in the highest firmament—let that Earth assign to us brilliance, strength, in highest royalty. On her the circulating waters flow the same, night and day, without

failure—let that Earth yield us milk, then let her sprinkle us with splendour. . . . Earth is Mother, I am Earth's son . . . Thou hast become great, a great station, great is thy trembling, stirring, quaking; great Indra defends thee unremittingly. Do thou, O Earth, make us shine forth as in the aspect of gold; let no one soever hate us".

The idea of the Sky-Father and the Earth-Mother may, however, be said to be a common feature of all the ancient religions. Fertilising of the Earth-Mother by the Sky-Father through the rains is a common belief, acquiring a religious significance almost from the dawn of human civilisation. It is not surprising that Kamakhya (with Cherapunji in the neighbourhood), has been called the yoni-pitha.

In the Aitareya Brahmana (8.5), the Earth is identified with Shri; in some of the later upanishads also, the Earth has been identified with the goddess Shri or Laksmi, the goddess of harvest and fortune. As the goddess Shri, the earth has been praised as the sovereign goddess, and homage has been paid to her. In the Puranic literature, the earth has frequently and variously been described as a power or sakti, associated with Visnu (cf. Bhu-devi). In the sculptural representation of the Gupta age, Visnu seems to retain something of the old Vedic Sun-god, and Shri and Bhu may stand for two aspects of the Earth-goddess, the aspects of prosperity and productivity.

In spite of the myths and legends that shroud the origin of Durga in the Puranas, and in spite of the philosophic grandeur she acquired, the paraphernalia of her worship that are prevalent in India—and particularly in Bengal—betray an amalgam of the Puranic goddess with the Earth-goddess. To be brief, only a few striking features may be mentioned. The first is that the annual worship of the mother goddess in her various aspects, begins in autumn, which marks the beginning of the harvest season in Bengal. To the common run of people in Bengal, the goddess Durga is popularly known as the autumnal goddess. In the autumnal worship of the goddess, her first representative is the branch of a bilva tree, in which the goddess is to be first awakened. In the next stage, the representative of the goddess is the Navapatrika, or something like a female.

figure, made with a plantain tree and eight other plants and herbs. In the worship of this Navapatrika, hymns are sung in praise of all the plants and herbs separately, identifying the mother goddess with each of these plants and herbs. The Mother has often been worshipped as one with paddy (dhanya-rupa), the staple food of a substantial portion of the Indian sub-continent. An epithet of Durga is Shakambhari, which means, "the herb-nourishing goddess". She is worshipped also as Annapurna or Annada, which means the goddess of food. During the spring, she is worshipped as the Spring goddess (Basanti Debi). In the autumnal worship of the goddess in the form of Lakshmi, the goddess of harvest and fortune, the Navapatrika is taken in some parts of Bengal, as the best representative of the goddess and, as a matter of fact, is worshipped as the goddess herself. All these will go to prove how the Mother, in later times, was identified with the harvest goddess and the goddess of fertility, who again is nothing but a particular aspect of Mother Earth.

It should have been noted that Prithivi is not the only mother goddess in the Vedic literature. The other prominent mother goddesses in the Vedic literature are Aditi, Saraswati Shri, Debi, Ratri, Ambika, Uma and Durga. It is generally supposed that the wide-spread prevalence of mother cult in Eastern India is to be accounted for by the presence of the non-Aryan matriarchal society in these countries. Mother worship and Sakti cult are hardly Vedic. These are to be traced to the non-Aryan structure of society, and the honourable place of women in it.

Whatever may be the value of this anthropological finding, there are other evidences in support of this contention. An analysis of the evolution of religious thought<sup>10</sup> of man indicates that things which are socially valuable and of great utilitarian interest, gradually come to acquire almost a religious sanctity. The social mind grows and develops, by centering itself round certain concepts. This, in its turn, comes to acquire a sacredness, an unimpeachable authority as in religious practices. There is a clear evolution of religions. The emergence of the mother cult in India can

<sup>10</sup> Comparative Religion—Douquet (Penguin).

perhaps be explained, if it be remembered that in non-Aryan society, polyandry was widespread. The father being very often unknown, the children were largely dependent on mother, and were known by her name. The children being dependent on mother, the mother came to be looked upon as the centre of society. Some men again think that the economic life of these non-Aryan tribes was exclusively dependent on agriculture. It is well-known how women played a very big part in sowing seeds, harvesting, and winnowing. This again might have led to the great importance of women, and the rise of mother cult in primitive society.\*<sup>11</sup>

What seems to be beyond doubt is that roughly between the beginning of the Christian era and the tenth century A.D. many local and indigenous goddesses pushed themselves from the social sub-strata to find a place in the Hindu pantheon, and by a process of generalisation, both religious and philosophical, were fused together and treated as aspects of the one universal mother goddess. It is not, therefore a fact, as is sometimes wrongly conceived, that the many mother goddesses are later emanations from the one mother goddess; on the contrary, the one mother goddess of the Puranic Age, seems to be a consolidation of the many mother goddesses—a consolidation brought about by the philosophy of Sakti.

This is the standpoint of tathya. But in the philosophy of Sakti, we find the standpoint of tattva. In the primitive condition of society, the mother held the most important position; and thus the cosmic mother became the most important deity. In India, from the age of the Indus Civilisation of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa down to the present time, the father God is represented by the linga (the male symbol), and the mother Goddess by the yoni (the female symbol). This representation of Siva-Sakti by the linga-yoni is a popular religious practice in India, and in most of the ancient and modern temples of Siva, the twin are worshipped in their symbolic representations. In the Tantra literature, (both Hindu and Buddhist), the Lord (Bhagavan, the male deity) is symbolically represented by a white dot (sweta-bindu), thus suggesting the likeness with semen, while the Creatrix (Bhagavati, the female deity) is

<sup>11</sup> Social Evolution—Gordon Childs.

represented by a red dot (shona-bindu), to suggest the analogy, with the menstrual blood containing the ovum.

From the speculative side, it was observed that everything that existed, existed by virtue of its power or powers. So God, who exists as the Creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe, must possess infinite power through which He creates, preserves and destroys the universe. In fact, His very being presupposes infinite power by virtue of which He Himself exists. This belief in the power of God is a universal belief; but what is important to remember is that this power or universal energy is something like a female counterpart of the possessor of this power. This power or *sakti*, being conceived as a counterpart of the possessor of *Sakti*, came to be regarded as the consort of the possessor. This is because not only among the *Saktas* (believers in *Sakti* in whatever form as the supreme deity), but in almost all other religious sects—the *Śaivas*, the *Sauras*, the *Ganapatyas* and the *Vaiṣṇavas*,—an important place is occupied by *Sakti*. There is seldom a god or a semi-god, or a demi-god of India of the Puranic Age, for whom a consort has not been conceived as the inseparable *Sakti*. The same has been the case with all the gods, the semi-gods and demi-gods of later phase of Mantrayana Buddhism.

A strong belief in the philosophy of *Sakti*, has brought about a popular synthesis among contrary philosophical standpoints of *Samkhya*, *Vedānta*, *Vaiṣṇavism* and *Tantricism* (See also Chs. IV and V). It was thus possible to make a synthesis of *Patanjala* standpoint and *Pratyabhijñā* analysis from the standpoint of *Sakti*. But for the philosophy of *Sakti*, it would have been impossible for a believer in *Advaita* standpoint like *Abhinavagupta* to interpret the typically dualistic *Patanjala* standpoint of *Bharata*. (See also Chs. VI and IX). The *Samkhya* speaks of *Purusa* and *Prakṛiti* as two independent and ultimate reals, whose interaction is, in fact, mere attribution resulting from the accidental contact of the two. In the *Puranas* and similar other popular religious literature, *Prakṛiti* is plainly conceived as the female counterpart of *Purusa*, and as such the two reals have been practically identified with *Sakti* and *Siva* of the *Tantras*. Just in a similar manner, the principle of *māyā* (illusion) of *Vedānta*, has been conceived as the *Sakti* of *Brahman*. These pairs have again been identified with *Viṣṇu* and his *Sakti*, *Lakṣmī*



or Sree, with Rama and Sita, and still later, with Krishna and Radha. Thus in the popular religious belief of India, *Śiva-Sakti* of the Tantras, *Purusa-Prakṛiti* of Sāṃkhya, *Brahman-Māyā* of Vedānta, and *Viṣṇu-Lakṣmī*, *Rama-Sita* and *Kṛiṣṇa-Radhā* of Vaiṣṇavism all mean the same thing.

This is the philosophy of *sakti*, or the standpoint of *tattva*. This philosophy of *Sakti* is clearly suggested by two passages in the *Bṛihad-aranyaka Upaniṣhad* (I. iv. 1, 3), where it is said that in the beginning was the Cosmic Being as the *Ātman* (Soul) in human form, who could never feel happy (i.e. enjoy himself through any process of self-realisation), for He was all alone. So He desired a second to Him. His being was something like a neutral point (See Chs. IX and X), where the ultimate principles of the male and the female lay unified in a deep embrace, as it were. This unified being divided himself into two—as the male and the female which formed the first pair, and all the pairs of the universe, are said to be replicas of this original pair. These passages of the *Bṛihad-aranyaka Upaniṣhad* have been extensively made use of in the Purāṇas, in the Tantras, as also in the later Buddhist and Vaiṣṇava *Sahajīya* schools, in which the idea of *Sakti* played an important part. Whatever has been created in this phenomenal process, has been created from the union of the two—energy and matter, the consumer and the consumed. They represent the two aspects of the one non-dual truth—one internal and the other external,—one illuminating, unchangeable, and immortal (*amṛita*), and the other obstructive, gross and perishable; the one the cause-potency and the other the effect potency. In the *Śaiva* and *Sakta* tantras, *prāṇa-rayi* of the *Prasna-Upaniṣhad* (I. 4), or *agni-soma* stand for *Śiva-Sakti*—the primordial male and female (See also Ch. X).

It should be distinctly understood that *Rasa* enjoyment always presupposes the philosophy of *Sakti*. No enjoyment is possible without *Sakti*. (See Ch. IV): There are clear indications that *Bharata* himself was aware of the place of *Sakti* in *Rasa* realisation. The *Sādhaka* by steadfast meditation focusses the attention on *Kṛiṣṇa* or *Kāma*. These become manifest and are held fast in the forehead of the *sādhaka*. *Kṛiṣṇa murti* becomes of the nature of *sthāyi-bhava*. So it follows that *sthāyi-bhava*, which underlies all *Rasa*-realisa-

state of godliness. Last of all, he becomes a luminous star in the heavens. So Indra was at the beginning a man; then he becomes a god; and in the last place, he became the sun. It is difficult to give any rational interpretation of many of the Rk-vedic suktas about Indra, unless such an interpretation be accepted. After the ascension into the heavens from the earth, the qualities of man, god and luminous planet are intermixed with one other, making it extremely difficult to give any interpretation from any one particular standpoint. Indra is worshipped as man, god or a luminous planet; or all these concepts in varying proportions and shades intermix with one another, making the concept of Indra extremely complex. So also Krishna is a mortal man; and Krishna is god; and Krishna is the sun. Dhruba is a man; he is also a luminous star. Vishnu granted Dhruba a boon that his mother should become a luminous star, and exist for an equal period in the sky with Dhruba. Dhruba himself was granted the boon that he was to live above all the seven wise sages, who have been changed into stars. The Vishnu-Purana writes,

Saptarsinam—asesanam ye ta Valmanika Sura.

Sarvesam—upari sthanam tava dattam maya Dhruba. (I. 12, 92, 94). The Visnu-Purana calls this the ascension of Dhruba to the heaven.

Dhrubasya arohanam divi (I. 12. 101).

To a careful reader, there are traces of this divi-arohana even in Bharata's Natya-sastra. It should be noted that the Sukla-Yajur-Prati-Sakhya from Adhya 1. Sutra, 130 to Adhya VIII. Sutra. 30, discusses swara, varna, akhyata. In Adhya, VIII, Sutra. 31, the "varna-devata" or the presiding deities of the different colours are enumerated. The Sukla-yajur-Prati-sakhya, 8.32, writes, "agneya kantha" meaning thereby that the presiding god of the different varnas, arising out of Kantha, is agni. So, Nirriti is the presiding deity of the varnas, arising out of the root of the jivha; and soma or the moon is the presiding deity of those varnas, which proceed out of the lips (Ibid. 8.37).

Immediately after this, in 8.49, the gotras of the different padas and in 8.51, their devatas are named. All these clearly point out that the philosophic outlook of the Hindus, wants to discover under all phenomenal changes, the ruling principles. This standpoint characterises Indian

thought from time immemorial. The presiding gods of varna, swara and pada were conceived as early as the Upanishadic age; but the seeds of such a line of thought can be traced earlier still. The Rik-veda enjoins worship of Mitra, Varuna and Dyava-prithivi as personified deities, and imagined the presence of a living spirit as permeating all nature. It became an instinct with primitive man to offer homage to these deities, presiding over all natural phenomena. This passage from the physical to the metaphysical, from the material to the spiritual, from the world to the ruling principle governing it, is a characteristic trait of Indian mind. This standpoint is of great significance in the understanding of how in Rasa-speculations concepts which are purely physical and physiological in origin, were transferred to the metaphysical and psychical plane.

It will be remembered that Bharata in Ch. 6. Slokas 44-5, speaks of following presiding deities of the eight rasas. These are:

**Sringaro Visnu-devatyō Hasya Pramatha—daivata.**

Rudro Rudradhivasca Karuno Yama-daivata.

Vibhatsasya Mahakala Kaladevo Bhayanaka.

Vira Mahendradeva syad-adbhuta Brahma daivata.<sup>3</sup>

Sarangadeva in *Sangita-ratnakara* (Adyar ed.) vol. I. p. 96 similarly speaks of the presiding deities of the seven swaras. Sarangadeva writes,

bahni-brahma—saraswatya sarva—sreesa—gancswara.  
sahasramsū rīti prakṭa kṛānāt—sadjadi—devata.<sup>4</sup>

Bharata's enumeration of the presiding deities of the different Rasas differs slightly from the enumeration of Sarangadeva. But the conformity more than the difference is of very great interest; for it clearly indicates how deeply the concept of divi-arohana had permeated Indian thought.

This line of speculation, which looks at god as a glorified man, or at man as a diminutive god, seems to knit together the speculations of Alamkara and Ayurveda. In the speculations of early man, the inward is inalienably associated with the outward: just as the outward is essentially the same as the inward. There is nothing wrong in such a standpoint.

In the Gifford Lectures for 1891, Max Muller discusses

this question of the divine and the human relations.<sup>14</sup> In p. 353, he discusses the principle of apotheosis. "This idea of apotheosis or deification of man, as it meets us in many parts of the world, may seem very strange to us. . . . It is to all intents and purposes a transition in alterum genus. Nay, if there are two genera, which seem completely to exclude one another, they are those of gods and men. . . . Yet from very early times we saw how both Greeks and Romans had accustomed their minds to the idea, that a man may become a god. That gods may assume the form of man, and even appear to man disguised in human shape, is more intelligible. . . . But to conceive that human nature could ever be changed into divine nature, requires an effort that seems at first" impossible. In p. 364,<sup>15</sup> Max Muller discusses the three roads leading to the discovery of something divine in man in ancient Greece.

In p. 364 of his "Anthropological Religion", Muller discusses the three roads leading to the discovery of something divine in Man. Confining his attention to Greece, he finds these three roads to be (1) ancestor worship, (2) Mythological belief in human heroes, as the offspring of Zeus, and (3) the third road started from a belief in divine powers, called Daimones. In the speculations of early man, the physical and the metaphysical are one; the inward is inextricably associated with the outward.<sup>16</sup> It will be seen throughout the present thesis how in Rasa speculations, a purely physiological and pathological standpoint is effectively used by Bharata to explain the intricacies of psychological evolution. It might almost be said that there is a parallel to this divi-arojana in Bharata's Rasa analysis. Bharata must have been unconsciously thinking of some such concept, when a purely physiological and pathological standpoint was used to explain the nature of aesthetic enjoyment. A corroborative evidence in this direction is to be found in Bharata's analysis of the adhi-dalvata of the different Rasas.

A further proof of Bharata's awareness of this divi-arojana seems to be noticeable in his recognition that

<sup>14</sup> Anthropological Religion—Muller.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 364.

<sup>16</sup> The Idea of the Holy—Otto Rudolf (London, 1943).

Rasa-enjoyment is essentially an enjoyment of Sattva. This is the considered opinion of all Alamkarikas, and writers on Rasa. Rasa enjoyment, which is physical and physiological in origin, is sublimated into an enjoyment, which has affinities with the enjoyment of Brahman Himself (Sahitya-Darpana. III. 2). There is no denying the fact that the Rasa-enjoyment is lokuttara; while Rasa of the body is confined essentially to this loka. But this is to be explained from the standpoint of avatara-tattva, a reverse process of divi-arohana-tattva. In p. 354 of his "Anthropological Religion", Max Muller discusses the underlying unity of the principles involved in apotheosis of man, or ananthroposis of god. Both are attempts at bringing the two worlds closer together. Prof. A. S. Geden\*<sup>17</sup> discusses how some nature gods are the result of the deification of notable men and women of the present or past ages. It is, as it were the nature of that Perfect Being is momentarily flashed on the surface of the purified sattva of the reader and the audience. The divi-arohana tattva, if Rasa enjoyment be looked at from the standpoint of bodily rases and dhatus, or the avatara tattva, if Rasa enjoyment be looked at from the standpoint of aprakrita visuddha sattva (Chs. IV and V), will explain how it is that a speculation which began purely on the laukika plane was gradually admitted to the precincts of high philosophy. Of these two, the aprakrita visuddha sattva standpoint demands closer scrutiny, for it appears that Bharata himself favoured this interpretation of Rasa. It is evident from his repeated references to visuddha sattva as characterising Rasa enjoyment (ch. 7, p. 95 Banaras ed.). It must not be understood thereby that Bharata was not aware of the divi-arohana tattva. This is clear from Bharata's analysis of the adhi-daivatas of the different Rasas. In fact, there is not much of difference between the two standpoints, one being complementary to the other.

#### IV

A fact, which has to be carefully remembered, and which set the present writer on the quest of the background

<sup>17</sup> Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. IX. p. 229.

of Bharata's Rasa speculations, is how it is that the same word "rasa" has been used in both Alamkara and Ayurveda. This is particularly important, because the philosophy of Indian grammar has always discouraged indiscriminate formation and use of sound to signify similar or cognate sense.\*<sup>18</sup> In other words, Indian grammar would not have permitted the use of the same word, rasa, in both cases, had not there been a fundamental unity of outlook.

In analysing the concept of Sabda-artha, it is necessary first of all, to find out the philosophy of nada. This nada is the first causal sound; this is the logos; this is the "word" in the Bible. Siva-Durga, Brahma or Narayana are all transformations, and made out of this first causal sound or nada. The Tantras speak of this nada as Kamakala, Kall or Kundalini. The Samkhya calls this the Prakriti. The Nyaya-Vaisesika calls this paramanu, without death or decay; the Purva-Mimamsa calls this apurva; and the Upanishads or the Vedanta speaks of this as prajna, avyakta or Iswara. This is nada Brahman or the eternal sound.

The Brhajjvala Upanishad speaks of the five faces of Siva. It is held that five mahabhutas, and five primal colours proceed out of these five faces. The creative forces are Agni and Soma, or the Sun and the Moon (See ch. X). The Brhajjvala Upanishad writes, "Sivagnina tanum dagdhva saktisomamritena ya". Siva burns everything to ashes; but Sakti brings all back to life by drenching them with nectar.

From the standpoint of the emergence of sound or nada, it should be noted that sound becomes first manifest in the anahata stage. This is the result of unimpeded vayu. This is from the face of Siva, known as tat-purusa. The vija sound at this stage is "a" sound. The vija mantra of this stage is "u" sound. This is the manipura cakra. The next stage in the formation of sound is sadyajata. The bhuta corresponding to this stage is the prithivi, and its cakra is mula-dhara. The vija mantra of this stage is "ma" kara. It is at this stage that the primal sound prepares itself for manifestation. The fourth stage is the stage of Nada itself. This is presided over by Vamadeva. This takes place at the swadhisihana cakra. The mukha which was turned eastward

<sup>18</sup> Linguistic speculations of the Hindus.—Chakrabarti (Calcutta University 1933)

In the tat-purusa, south-ward in the aghora, westward in the sadyajata, is now turned northward in the vamadeva. Here for the first time, Nada manifests itself.

But this Nada must pass further through the stages of bindu and Kalā before it enters Kalātita. At the bindu stage, Iswara is the presiding deity. The Yoga philosophy holds that disturbed vayu in different parts of body, produces sound. So all sounds are the result of disturbance; and this takes place primarily at the Swadhisthana stage.

Nagesa in the Manjusa, p. 171 has made an attempt to explain the origin of vāk with reference to cosmogony. After the annihilation of the cosmic world, accompanied by a complete cessation of all actions, the creative function (maya), he maintains, is finally absorbed in the infinite consciousness. When the Supreme Being feels the necessity of creation, His potentiality takes the form of a bindu—a subtle point retaining in itself, immense power, and combining the three gunas. This is, in reality, an inexhaustible source of energy (sakti-tattva). The unconscious part, or inertia is called bija, the part representing a mixture of both cit (consciousness) and acit (unconsciousness) is known as nada (sound), and the intelligent element generally goes by the name of bindu. Regarded as the ultimate source of all forms of vāk, this nada is called sabda-Brahman. The tantrika descriptions of vāk, as are to be met in the Sarada-tilaka and other treatises, have a striking similarity with this view. Bindu, nada and bija are all said to represent the different aspects of the one and the same thing. It is further stated that they stand for the trinity of godhead, having its manifestations in fire, in the moon and in the sun. In accordance with the Tantrika conception, bindu is a symbol of the seminal principle, while nada means a dissemination of energy (Sakti), and it is out this combination that the world is said to have been created.

It should be remembered that this evolution of sound may further be looked at from the standpoint of sphota. The sphota-vadins hold that at the background of all sound, there is one changeless, indivisible, sphota without any krama. Pronounced sound is only representative of it. This being one and changeless without any mutation, is sabda-brahma. But it must not be forgotten that though at the background of sabda, there is one changeless sphota, on the plane of

ordinary existence, this changeless sphota undergoes changes, and gives rise to other sphotas. The nitya-sphota may be without any krama. But it is possible to find a sequence in the dhvani, which proceeds out of this nitya-sphota. The unmanifest stages of this emerging sound, are known as (1) para, (2) pasyanti, and (3) madhyama. The stage where sound has already manifested itself, is known as (4) valkhari.

This classification of vāk into four different kinds, is to be met also in the Rk-veda, I. 164.45. This Rk. speaks of four different kinds of vāk, though it does not definitely mention their names, and it distinctly lays down that it is the last and fourth form of speech, which is spoken by men, the other forms lying latent, i.e. too subtle to be uttered by our vocal organs. Patanjali has explained catvari vak-parimita padani as what refers to the four categories of grammar, namely, noun, verb, preposition and particle (Mahabhasya. I. 1. 1). But later grammarians, like Bhartrhari and Nagesa as well as philosophers like Gaudapada and Sayana found in this particular expression a clear reference to the four well-known divisions of speech, viz. para, pasyanti, madhyama and valkhari. Guha nihita, as explained by Nagesa, seems to be quite in agreement with the tantrika point of view. Guha means, he holds, the three innermost parts of the body, namely muladhara, navel region and the heart (Manjusa: p. 182), and he goes on to say that the first three types of speech are not comprehensible to everybody. The Yogins with their inward vision revealed, are only competent to realise these mystic forms of speech. A grammarian of the type of Patanjali and Bhartrhari is also supposed to have visualised these subtle things by dispelling the darkness of ignorance through the aid of their illuminating knowledge of sabda-sastra. The valkhari is, however, distinguished from the rest by being perfectly audible, and capable of being expressed through the medium of letters. This is the popular form of speech current in human society. It is at this stage that there is a split between sabda and artha.

Sabda and artha are so closely connected with each other that one cannot be conceived without the other. While describing the mystic way in which the Highest Godhead is united with His Supreme power—a union which is often represented as the association of parama purusa with parama prakriti, or that of Siva and Sakti, Kalidasa could not think



of a more appropriate similitude than the relation between sabda and artha (Raghu-vamsa, 1.1.)

What does the utterance of a word bring with it? When a word is uttered, says Bhartrhari, three things, namely, the particular word, the intention of the speaker and the object that is denoted, are all comprehended at a time (Vakya-padiya, 3.1). A sound that does not fulfil this condition, i.e., fails to present before us this trinity of things, is meaningless. Prof. Dittrich has discovered three elements in a statement; the sound, the import and the actual fact. Unless we recognise some sort of connection between the two, no logical account for the derivation of meaning from a word can be given. Bhartrhari has found in such a relation the fundamental solution of why things are invariably signified by their corresponding words.

Various are the ways in which different schools of Indian thought have sought to explain this relation. Let us first find out the real issues involved in such a standpoint. Some hold that the relation between word and thing is permanent or natural. They are the Mīmamsakas and the grammarians. Their argument is that this relation seems to be eternal, as no author of it is mentioned in the scriptures. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas on the other hand, look upon this relation as conventional (i.e., the outcome of Sanketa), or as the creation of divine volition. Some again (and Puṇyārāja is one among them) are of opinion that the relation between sound and sense is just the same as exists between the cause and the effect, manifestor (grahaka) and manifest (grahya) and so on. *Some have made no distinction between speech and thought, i.e., take word and thing as convertible with each other. A reciprocity of causal connection, sambandha—samuddesa has also been detected between word and meaning. A climax was, however, reached when sound and sense were declared to be essentially the same. The question how words come to be invested with acquired meaning (not from the standpoint of the Dhvani-vādins), will be discussed in Ch. II.*

The grammarians have analysed at length this relation between sabda and artha. The view of Vyādi, as alluded to by Puṇyārāja under Vakya-padiya I. 26, is that there is no author of the relation that exists between words and the objects denoted by them. The grammarians seem to have

gone a step further than the Mīmamsakas by insisting also on the eternality of meanings. The Mahabhasya has started with the dictum that words, their meanings and the relation between them are all permanently fixed, i.e. eternal. The eternality of relation has been stated in clear terms by Patanjali—*nityo hyarthovataṁ arthairbhi-sambandha* (Mahabhasya. I. 1.1). As to how this kind of permanent relation comes under one's cognition, it is said that the object for which words are expressly used, constitutes in itself a sufficient proof to show that the association between words and their meanings cannot be anything but natural and permanent. If there were no such relation, i.e. if *śabda* and *artha* were incapable of being brought together by a natural affinity, no one would have ever felt the necessity of using words for the sake of communicating his thoughts to others.

It follows that Bharata must have been keenly aware of the relation between *śabda* and *artha*. It is particularly so, because Patanjali seems to have deeply influenced Bharata's outlook (See ch. VI). It is useful to remember that an exactly similar position is also held in the Abhidhamma system. In Pali, *śabda* means a sound or a word, and *artha* means a concept or matter, or in other words, the former is a sign that signifies the latter. *Pannatti* (Sk. *Prajñapti*) which means both name and notion, or term and concept is of several kinds. There is a two-fold derivation of the term, *pannatti*: "it is either that which makes known or presents the thing denoted before one's mind (*pannapatitī*) or that which is made known (*pannaplyatitī*). It is therefore, a term, which has combined in itself the double aspects of *pramāṇa* and *pramēya* of the Hindu philosophy. It is both the means of knowing and the object knowable. In the Abhidhamma, two classes of *pannatti* are found, namely *śabda-pannatti*, and *attha-pannatti*. The former is the same as *nama-pannatti*. *Śabda-pannatti* is significantly so called inasmuch as it renders the intended sense intelligible to others, and *attha-pannatti* is so called as it becomes cognisable to others by means of a sign or a word. It appears that the Buddhist philosophers like the Hindus, held that there is a correlation or interdependence of these two kinds of *pannatti*, between word and meaning.

The Tantras are equally emphatic on this indissoluble relation between *śabda* and *artha*. In the Tantras, *Vak* is

not only described as the creative potentiality of the Supreme Being, but as one with, or inseparable from, Him. Vak is again, called the first manifestation of *cit-sakti*, that lies dormant in all beings. The production of sound is explained by the Tantrikas as a kind of Movement (*spandana*) in the Consciousness, which remains otherwise calm and serene (*asabda*).

To understand the Tantrika view of *śabda* and *artha*, it is necessary to analyse the doctrine of *bindu*. The *Prapanca-sara*, *Saradatilakas* and other *āgamas* have dealt with this particular topic with considerable thoroughness. It is said that the creative impulse of *Parasiva*, inseparably united with *Para Sakti*, takes the form of a *bindu*—the reservoir of energy in the terms of the Tantras (*Sakti-tattva*). (*Prapanca-sara*, I. 41). Of the three primordial elements (*Siva*, *Sakti*, and *bindu*), recognised by the Tantras, it is *bindu* from which arises, as its first revelation, the subtle form of sound, called *nada*. From this indistinct and indeterminate, *nada-bindu*, which has its origin in the internal part of the body, evolves the intellect with its dual aspects of word and meaning (*Prapanca-sara*, I. 44). *Bindu* divides itself into three aspects, namely gross, subtle and extremely subtle forms, answering to the three stages, such as *bindu*, *nada* and *bija*. When *bindu* splits up by the will of God, a subtle and indistinct sound is produced therefrom. This is the first evolution of sound, the primordial sound, *Om*, called *śabda-Brahman* by the *Āgamas*. This has been variously termed; sometimes as *pranava*, and sometimes as *parā vāk*. The meditation on *śabda Brahman* is held to be a distinct step towards a still higher realisation. One who has a deeper insight into this mystic form of *vāk* is ultimately blessed with a positive knowledge of the Absolute.

It is difficult to arrive at a precise definition of *bindu*. One may identify it with the vital element, with "the first seed of creation," or simply with the *jivanu* (germ-atom) from a biological point of view. In the language of the Tantras, *bindu* is an extremely subtle entity from which the six pure paths (*adhva*) follow, and to which they are ultimately reduced. *Bindu* is the last point in the universal chain of causation.

*Bindu*, under the influence of *māya*, is bifurcated into

mind and matter, or sabda and artha. The first product of bindu is nada, which in turn, gets itself divided into the denotative and the denoted, i.e., word and meaning. Vacya and vacaka in their mutual conjunction constitute a vivid parallelism to the eternal relation between para-siva and para-sakti. The six paths that proceed from bindu have, on the basis of word and its denotation, been divided under two groups: (1) mantra (incantation), varna (letter), and pada (syllable or inflected word) and (ii) kala (power), tattva (principle or real entity), and bhuvana (world). The former group represents the different varieties of sound, and the latter those of meanings.

In considering the relation between sabda and artha, the question that naturally rises in one's mind is how the sound uttered by us for the purpose of denoting some object turns out so powerful a symbol as to convey exactly the same sense to others. The question may also be put in a different form : why does a man understand nothing but a pot, whenever he hears the sound ghata? The answer offered by the Tantras in course of showing the significance of the mantras is calculated to throw some light on the solution of the problem. The efficiency of mantras (as are composed of words and matrika-varnas) constitutes an important and cardinal teaching of the Tantras.

Everything has a particular name or samjna, whereby it is distinguished from the rest. There is a natural connection between a name and the object so named. A thing or a person has an inseparable relationship with its or his name. No other than the person, for instance, who has got that name, Hari is likely to respond, whenever the same is uttered. This will go to show the nature of kinship between the two. Naman and namin (name and the person named) are closely related with each other. The later school of Vaishnavism had laid supreme stress on the importance of naman (or bija-mantra), making the devata and his name altogether coincident or identical. Some have gone so far as to eulogise naman as of greater efficiency than the deity himself. The Tantras have also subscribed to the same view by identifying a mantra with its presiding deity (mantradhishthatri-devata). In the Tantrik texts, no difference has been made between a mantra or bija, and the devata that it represents in a mystical way. The relation which a mantra bears to its deity is the

same as vacaka-vacya, i.e. a particular deity is always denoted by a particular bija-mantra. The mantras are not lifeless, and meaningless syllables ; but they are full of potentiality. Every one of them, as the Tantras enjoin, is the living symbol of a deity and an inexhaustible source of power.

Inseparable is the relation in which speech and thought have mingled together. This undivided character of sabda and artha comes to one's comprehension only in a stage of higher spiritual cultivation, when all forms of dualism disappear or merge into an undivided entity. Pure consciousness, in the terms of theological interpretation, presents itself to man in two different modes of internal and external experience. This is why it has been said that sabda and artha are but different aspects of one and the same thing (Vakyapadiya, 2. 31). When sabda and artha are reduced to their ultimate nature, the high walls of convention creating such differentiation break down to pieces. Bhartrhari has, on the basis of this deep-rooted spiritual conviction, postulated a peculiar doctrine of evolution, which sought to explain the whole phenomenal universe as a transformation or vivarta of sabda-brahman, or what is called Logos in Christian theology.

All these will indicate that there is a subsisting relation between the sign and the object so signified, in some shape or other. The existence of this relation, whether natural or conventional, has been clearly brought out by Indian teachers and grammarians. Bhartrhari in Vakyapadiya I, has emphatically asserted that there is a relation between a word and its meaning. Helaraja by writing, Swabhavatah eva niruho na tu purusena nivesita ityatha, has again emphasized this standpoint. The same position has been strengthened further when he speaks of this relation as fixed by nature. The existence of a connection is sufficiently borne out by the very nature of a word and its meaning.

The subsisting relation between word and its meaning is dominant through the first three stages of evolution of sound. It is at the stage of Vaikhari, that there is for the first time, a dissociation of sound and sense. Uptill this stage, sound and sense are inextricably mixed up. But beyond this stage, sound and sense are distinct, and separate. It is to be noted that the diverse senses, attached to the word, Rasa, must have been put on it after the Vaikhari stage.

When Rasa is defined as "swdya-madhura . . . . .", Rasa is obviously looked at as yet undivided into separate ideas in the Valkhari stage. It thinks of one of the three stages, para, pasyanti and madhyama ,where sound and sense are still undistinguished.

People who cannot look beyond the Valkhari stage, are led to believe that there is no co-ordination between sound and sense. But those others, who can look into madhyama, or pasyanti or para, should know that sound and sense are eternally wedded together; and that if the ancient writers had used the word rasa with reference to both alamkara and ayurveda, it showed unmistakably that the speculations in these two branches must have been of an allied nature, and that one must have been influenced by the other.

## CHAPTER II

### Sense-knowledge and Aesthetic Experience, in Indian Analysis. Role of Vibhavas in Bharata's Rasa-Sutra

It has been very little noticed that Bharata's Rasa-Sutra vibhava-anubhava-vyabhiচারi-samyogena rasanishpatti presupposes an awareness of the earlier speculations on the nature of sense-knowledge in Abhidhamma philosophy, as also in the earlier and later speculations of the Samkhya. The Abhidhamma philosophy in analysing consciousness, recognises in it a complex of various psychic factors, called Cetasika. The most simple ones are the Cakkhu-Vinnana (eye-consciousness), Sota-Vinnana (ear-consciousness), Ghana-Vinnana (nose-consciousness), Jivha-Vinnana (tongue-consciousness), and Kaya-Vinnana (touch-consciousness). They are pure sensations, unalloyed with any reflection over the object. But if they are examined more closely, they are found to consist of as many as seven factors in them, namely, (1) Phassa (contact of the subject with the object), (2) Vedana (the feeling of the subject that it has been affected by the object), (3) Sanna (marking the object), (4) Cetana (volition, inclining towards the object), (5) Ekaggata (concentrating towards the object), (6) Jivitindriya (psychic life) and (7) Manasikara (attending to the object).

Phassa is the "contact" of the subject with the object, which may be either material or ideational. There can be no consciousness without this primary factor. This "phassa" corresponds to the apprehension of vibhava in Bharata's Rasa-analysis, or the Indriya-Indriyārtha-samyoga in the analysis of the Samkhya.

Vedana is the feeling of the subject that it has been affected either pleasantly, painfully or neutrally; and it is essentially found in all consciousness. This would correspond to anubhava in Rasa-analysis.

Sanna is "marking the appearance of the object" that makes it possible to recognise a thing. As it marks only the surface-appearance, without going into its intrinsic nature, it is very often deceptive, as in the case of an illusion. Cetana is the "motiveless inclination" of the subject towards the object when a Phassa has already taken place. In the

moral or immoral types of consciousness (kusala or akusala vipaka citta), this factor is called "karma", either of the mind, or the speech, or the action.

Ekaggata is concentrating upon an object; it varies in strength in different moments of consciousness. In Pancadwaravajjana or in Cakkhu-vinnana, it is very feeble, but in the Jhana, it is fully steady. It appears that the Abhidhamma analysis from Sanna to Ekaggata takes a different course, leaning more towards knowledge (jnana) than towards pure aesthetic cognition (bodha or pratiti). But a closer analysis would reveal that jnana and bodha are two facets of the same reality.

The Abhidhamma in analysing the objects of consciousness<sup>1</sup> (Bk. I. Ch. III. Sec. 5. XIX) notes how consciousness is the relation that the subject has with the object, either of a material or ideational nature. It cannot be thought to have an independent existence of its own. "There are six kinds of the 'object' of consciousness, namely—(1) visible, (2) audible, (3) odorous, (4) sapid, (5) tactual and (6) ideational. The Abhidhamma divides ideational objects again, into six kinds. These six "objects" of consciousness arise through the six doors. "Visible form alone is the object of all the types of consciousness, arising through the eye-door. It should necessarily be presentative. In the same manner, sound is the object of all the types of consciousness, arising through the ear-door; smell of all these arising through the nose-door; taste of all these arising through the tongue-door; and touch of all those arising through the touch-door. All of them must necessarily be presentative." (Ibid. XXLa).

"Form is the only object of eye-consciousness. Similarly, sound, smell, taste and touch are respectively the only objects of ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness and touch-consciousness" (Bk. I. Ch. III. Sec. 5. XX11a). "The types of Pancadwaravajjana arise on all the five objects of senses, viz., form, sound, smell, taste and touch" (Ibid. XX 11 b).

The objects of consciousness are called "alambana", a term which Bharata also uses in describing objects of sense-experience. This is alambana vibhava. The Abhidhamma is not content with an analysis of the the objects of aesthetic

<sup>1</sup> Abhidhamma Philosophy—J. Kasyap (Nalanda. 1954).



experience. It also discusses the organs or *indriyas*, which are six in number. These are (1) eye, (2) ear, (3) nose, (4) tongue, (5) skin and (6) heart. The *Abhidhamma* goes on further, and finds the presence of all the six organs in the *Kama-world* "Nose, tongue and skin, these three organs, do not exist in the *Rupa world*. In the *Arupa-world*, there are no organs at all" (Bk. I. Ch. III. Sec. 6. XXIV). The *Abhidhamma* thus distinguishes between sensations of eye and ear, which belong to *Rupa-loka*. In *Arupa-loka* cognition exists by itself, independent of the six organs.

Some of the fundamental conceptions of the *Abhidhammists* together with the manner of argument advanced by them to establish their validity closely follow those of the particular school of *Samkhya* represented in the *Yoga-Sutra* and specially in its *Bhasya*<sup>2</sup>. It should be noted that *Bharata's Rasa-speculations* are deeply indebted to *Patanjala* tradition (Ch. VI). It is needless here to enter into an examination of the *gunas* of the *Samkhya* and the *dhammas* of the *Abhidhammists*, which constitute the basic conceptions of their respective systems.<sup>3</sup> It is of more immediate interest to note here that the *Patanjala* analysis of sense-knowledge follows the *Abhidhamma* position. The study of *Panca-Dvaravajjana* is very close to the *Patanjala* analysis of *indriya-indriyarthasamyoga*. The *Abhidhamma* writes, "Form is the only object of eye-consciousness; similarly, sound, smell, taste and touch are respectively the only objects of ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness and touch-consciousness" (Bk. I. Ch. III. 5. xxii a). "The types of *Panca-Dvaravajjana* and *Sampaticchana* consciousness arise on all the five objects of senses, viz. form, sound, smell, taste and touch" (Ibid. xxii.b.). *Panca-Dvaravajjana* and the two *Sampaticchana*, these three types of consciousness, are together called *Manodhatuttika* or the "triple mind-element". They arise on all the five objects of sense.\*<sup>4</sup>

The seat of the five *indriyas* is according to *Abhidhamma* analysis, the heart and not the brain. In Bk. I. Ch. III. Sec. 6. xxv.b, the *Abhidhamma* writes, "*Mano-dhatu* (simple cognition) i.e. the two *Sampaticchana* and the *Panca-Dvaravajjana*

<sup>2</sup> Central Conception of Buddhism. Ch. XXII—Prof. Stecherbatsky.

<sup>3</sup> *Dharmas of the Buddhists and the Gunas of the Samkhya*—Ibid. I.H.Q. Vol. X. pp. 737-80.

<sup>4</sup> *Abhidhamma Philosophy*. Bk. I. Ch. III. Sec. 5.—J. Kasyapa (Nalanda. 1951)

consciousness, arise depending on the heart-organ". Caraka, in exact agreement with the Abhidhamma position, recognises the hrdaya as the seat of all forms of consciousness. Caraka writes,

षडंगसंगं विज्ञानभिन्द्रियान्यर्थपंचकम् ।  
 आत्मा च सगुणश्चेतश्चिन्त्यश्च हृदि संस्थितम् ॥  
 तस्योपधातान्मूर्च्छायान् भेदान्मरणभृच्छवि ।  
 यद्धि तत्स्पर्शविज्ञानं धारि तत् तत्र स्थितम् ॥  
 तत् परस्योजसः स्थानं तत्र चैतन्यसंग्रहः ।  
 हृदयं महदर्थश्च तस्मादुक्तं चिकित्सिते ॥

(Sutra-Sthanam 30.2)

The body consisting of the six limbs, (2) knowledge, (3-7) the five senses and the five objects of the senses, (8) the soul as invested with attributes, (9) the mind, and (10) the thoughts are all seated in the hrdaya. Caraka in Siddhi-sthanam (9.3) again writes, तत्र हृदि दशधमन्यः प्राणोदानौ मनो-बुद्धिश्चेतना महाभूतानि चनम्याममरा इव प्रतिष्ठितानि । शिरसीन्द्रियानि इन्द्रियप्राणवहानि च स्रोतंसि सूर्यमिवगतस्तयः संश्रितानि । (6)

In the hrdaya are seated the (1) ten dhmanis and (2) prana, (3) udana vayus, (4) mind, (5) intelligence, and (6-10) the five mahabhootas. Just as the rays of the sun are being supported by the sun, similarly the sense of perception and channels of the senses and life are also being supported by the heart." Cakrapani, commenting on the five mahabhootas mentioned in this passage, says that the bhootas mean the five objects or indriyārtha of the five senses of perception. These are (1) kshiti, i.e. carrier of smell, and (2) apabhoota, i.e. carrier of taste, (3) teja bhoota; i.e. carrier of form, (4) vayu bhoota, i.e. carrier of touch and (5) akasa bhoota, i.e. carrier of sound. Caraka by singling out prana and udana as the two vayus seated in the hrdaya, emphasizes the sensory functions of the heart. These breaths are briefly described in the Yoga-bhasya; and to a greater length in the Tattva-Vaisaradi (Yoga-sutra III. 39). Of these, prana is located within the heart. But it extends upto the mouth and the nose through which the air is drawn and then expelled from the lungs.

Caraka refers to all five indriyas or senses as the seat of Prana Vayu.

स्थानं प्राणस्य शीर्षोः-कर्णजिह्वाक्षिनासिकाः ।

प्लीवन-क्षवधूद्गार-श्वासहारादि कर्म च ॥ (7)

(Cikitsa-sthanam. 28.4)

Vagbhata in Astanga-hrdaya writes,

उरः कन्ठचरो बुद्धि-हृदयेन्द्रिय-चित्तधृक् ।

प्लीवन-क्षवधूद्गार-निःश्वासान्न प्रवेशकृत् ॥ (8)

(Sutra-sthanam. 12)

Caraka speaks of touch, hearing, taste, sight and smell as all objects of ahara; these are all functions of the heart. In Susruta also, the hrdaya is said to be the primary seat of consciousness in animated beings. Sleep overcomes a man whenever the hrdaya is enveloped in the illusive effects of tamas". (Sarira-sthanam. 4.35). Susruta writes once again, "The hrdaya is the seat of intellect and mind" (Sarira-sthanam. 3.18). Caraka discusses how Vayu, which is seated in the heart, when afflicted, aggravates the doses. (Nidana-sthanam 7.3). "Gaining control of the hrdaya, it then obstructs the channels through which the mind operates, thus begetting insanity". It is needless to emphasize the part played by Vayu in all kinds of sense-knowledge. Caraka writes,

वायुरायुर्वलं वायुर्वायुर्धाता शरीरिणाम् ।

वायुर्विधमिदं सर्वं प्रमुर्वायुश्च कीर्त्तितः ॥ (9)

(Cikitsa-sthanam 28.2)

The Prasna-Upanishad writes of prana-vayu : अहमेवैतत् पञ्चात्मानं विमस्यैतद्वाणमवष्टभ्य विधारयामीति; the prana divides itself into five; and thus maintains the body. Again, it is said प्राणश्च विधारयितव्यं च or the prana in its activities, sustains life. The Upanishads emphasize that by prana is meant the power by which ahara or sensuous impressions are taken in, and turned into flesh and blood. The Mahabharata in Aswa-medha. 17, writes, स्रोतोभिर्यै विजानाति इन्द्रियार्थान् शरीरभृत् । तैरेव च विजानाति प्राणान् आहारसम्भवान् ।

The prana which always gathers ahara, is at the root of all knowledge. In the Santi-parvan. 185, it is said, वहत्तन्नरसन्नाम्यो दशप्राणप्रचोदिताः । The prana and other Vayus impel the nadis to carry the rasa of anna or ahara. In Aswamedha. 19, the different activities of the prana are clearly indicated.

मुक्तं मुक्तमिदं कोष्ठे कथमन्नं विपच्यते ।  
 कथं रसत्वं व्रजति शोणितत्वं कथं पुनः ॥  
 तथा मांसं च मेदश्च स्रायुस्थोनि च पेपति ।  
 कथमेतानि सर्वाणि शरीराणि शरीरिणाम् ॥  
 वर्द्धन्ते वर्द्धमानस्य वर्द्धते च कथं बलम् ।  
 निरोजसां निर्गमनमनागंच पृथक् पृथक् ॥  
 कुतो वायं निश्चसिति उच्छ्वसित्यपि वा पुनः ॥ (10)

Food or anna when taken in, is turned into rasa, and from rasa is developed first of all, blood. Anna sustains flesh (mamsa), bones (asthi), fat (meda) and nerves (snayu). The strengthening of body, and maintenance of the growth of a growing body, the separation of inert matter and its throwing away, all these are the results of the activities of prana. This prana which gathers all sense-impressions, is seated in the hrdaya, so that the hrdaya itself is activated in search of new aharas. This again is exactly the position held in Caraka's Sutra-sthanam. 28. 2. Caraka writes: पुष्यन्ति त्वाहार रसाद्रसरधिरमांसमेदोऽस्थिमज्जशुक्रौजांसि पञ्चेन्द्रियद्रव्याणि धातुप्रसादसञ्चकानि । (11) All these are the results of ahara, gathered by hrdaya.

Vayu acts as the mediator between indriya and indriyārtha. In any kind of sense-knowledge, the indriya and the indriyārtha must come together. Caraka says that in the absence of Vedana (arising out of sense-knowledge), the soul attains its purest self.

सर्वविद् सर्वसन्न्यासी सर्वयोगनिःसृतः ।  
 एकः प्रशान्तो मृतात्मा कैलिङ्गैरुपलभ्यते ॥ (12)

(Sarira-sthanam 1.2)

But this detached, perfectly pure soul enters human body, when it comes in contact with manas. Caraka writes,

सादयश्चेतनाधातुपष्टास्तु पुरुषःस्मृतः ।

चेतनाधातुरप्येकः स्मृतः पुरुषसंज्ञकः ॥

पुनश्च धातुभेदेन चतुर्विंशतिकः स्मृतः ।

मनोदशेन्द्रियाण्यर्थः प्रकृतिश्चाष्टधातुकी ॥ (13)

(Sarira-sthanam 1.4)

This manas by impregnating the cetana-dhatu, activates the soul. This manas is of the nature of Sakti. Caraka and Bharata are agreed on the important role of manas in Rasa enjoyment.\*<sup>5</sup> Caraka is perfectly clear how knowledge on the part of the detached cetana-dhatu is made possible by the intervention of manas. Caraka goes on:

या यदिन्द्रियमाश्रित्य जन्तोर्बुद्धिः प्रवर्त्तते ।

याति सा तेन निर्देशं मनसा च मनोभवा ॥

भेदात् कार्येन्द्रियार्थानां बहुव्यो वै बुद्ध्यः स्मृताः ।

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थानामेकैका सन्निकर्षजाः ॥

... ..

बुद्धीन्द्रियमनोऽर्थानां विद्यात् योगघरं परम् ।

चतुर्विंशतिकः ह्येष राशिः पुरुषसंज्ञकः ॥ (14)

(Sarira-sthanam. 1.10)

This rasi-purusa is one, who enjoys sights and sounds, and takes in all kinds of sense-impressions. In Sarira-sthanam. 1. 14, Caraka describes the character of this rasi purusa, who has likes and dislikes, strong preferences and equally strong avoidances. He is, as Caraka says, पुरुषो राशिसन्नस्तु मोहेच्छाद्वेषकर्मनः । Caraka emphasizes that the soul, which is a-cetana, is activated by manas.

अचेतनं क्रियावच्च मनश्येतयिता परः ।

युक्तस्य मनसा तस्य निर्दिश्यन्ते विभोः क्रियाः ॥ (15)

(Sarira-sthanam 1.20)

The tenets and doctrines of Samkhya referred to in Caraka as also in the Yoga-Bhasya, do not always correspond

\* For a detailed analysis of the part played by manas or visuddha-satva in Rasa enjoyment, see Chs. IV and V.

to those of Iswarakrishna. From a careful study of these texts, it is found that the Yoga-bhasya follows the Varsaganya school of Samkhya, and specially that of Vindhyavasin. This can be noticed from the fact that the author of the Bhasya in support of his statements, occasionally quotes fragments from the works of Varsaganya and his followers.

It is of great interest to note Bharata's analysis of indriya-indriyatha in support of the contention that Bharata is following the Patanjala tradition of the Samkhya. Bharata writes,

शब्दं स्पर्शं च रूपं च रसं गन्धं तथैव च ।

इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थांश्च भावैरभिनयेद्वबुधः ॥ (81)

... ..

पञ्चानामिन्द्रियार्थानां भावा ह्येतैर्नुभाविनः ।

श्रोत्रत्वक्त्रेजिह्वानां प्राणस्य च तथैव हि ॥ (85)

इन्द्रियार्थाः समनसो भवन्ति ह्यनुभाविनः ।

न वेत्ति ह्यमनाः किञ्चिद्विषयं पञ्चधागतम् ॥ (87)

... ..

इष्टे शब्दे तथा रूपे स्पर्शे गन्धे तथा रसे ।

इन्द्रियैर्मनसा प्राप्तैः सौमुख्यं प्रदर्शयेत् ॥ (90) (16)

(G.O.S. Vol. III)

All forms of sense-knowledge are included; and Bharata holds that indriya and indriyārtha must be brought together for any kind of cognition. Bharata holds further that sense-perception, which lies at the root of all Rasa-enjoyment, is only possible for one who is "Samanassa", a term, he uses once again in Natya-Sastra, Ch. VI in describing Rasa-realisation (See Ch. IV). Bharata uses a synonym of Samanassa in sloka 90, quoted above; it is सौमुख्यः. All forms of sense-knowledge are ahara (See Ch. II. Part II); and such ahara is for Samanassa. If one is not Samanassa or amana (sloka. 87), meaning not favourably disposed to knowledge brought in by the senses, then there cannot be any Rasa-realisation. The Abhinava-Bharati explains समनस in a similar way. Abhinava writes (III. p. 183-4) मनस्संयोगजो य आत्मन इच्छाद्वेष-

मायस्त्वक्षणे भावः समनस इत्युक्त । कापिलदृशि तु विन्ध्यवासिनो मानस एव :  
ईश्वरकृष्णादिमते मनःशब्देनात्र बुद्धिः । (17)

Abhinava recognises\*\* that Bharata's concept of manas is closer to Vindhyavasini. This admission at once affiliate Bharata's Rasa-speculations to Patanjala tradition, and Caraka; for it has already been noticed that philosophically speaking, Patanjala and Vindhyavasini belong to the same tradition of the Samkhya.

Caraka's analysis of how a-cetana or nirvikara-atma is activated by the intervention of manas, has deeply influenced Bharata's Rasa-speculations, as also the speculations of Abhinavagupta. The shining-forth or sphurana of the soul would have been unvaried, and hence imperceptible, if there had not been the play of Sakti (vide Ch. I). Sakti helps the soul to shine forth as a many-splendoured thing. The manas is this cit-sakti, which makes possible the enjoyment of Rasa. The Samkhya recognises two different functions of indriyas. These are (1) perception, and (2) action. The first group constitutes what are called Jnanendriya. Eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin are the five organs of perception, and form, sound, smell, taste and touch are their objects respectively. All objects are perceived by organs of perception. Tongue, hand, leg, anus and penis are the five organs of action, and their objects are speech, reception, motion, excretion and pleasure respectively. By these two sets of indriyas, jnanendriya and karmendriya, all actions are performed (vide Introduction. IV).

Besides these ten indriyas, there exists one more indriya, which is called the mind. The mind is not only the eleventh indriya; it is the regulator and the principal of the other indriyas. Other indriyas, particularly organs of perception, are inactive without the mind. Eye is an organ of perception: its function is vision and its object is form. If the form of any external object appears before the sight (what the Abhidhamma calls "phassa"), it is received by the eyes, the organ of perception. But if that object is not received by the mind, no knowledge of that object is possible; in other words, the object is not visible. This shows that objects are not really seen with eyes; these are seen with the mind. Mind

\* For a clear exposition of Abhinavagupta's concept of manas or sakti, see Ch. V.

is the real organ of sense. The eye only receives the external form. The ear only receives the sound; the nose only the smell, the tongue the taste, and the skin only the touch of an object. But the knowledge of form, sound, smell, taste and touch is only imparted through the mediation of mind. The mind is thus really an organ of preception. Again, the five organs of action (Karmendriya) also are inactive without the mind. The inspiration of their activity comes from the mind. Thus mind is simultaneously the organ of perception and of action. Susruta says ; "Mind is both the organ of perception and of action" उभयात्कर्क मनः (Sarira-sthanam 1.4).

None of the organs of perception and action can perform its function without depending upon the mind. An organ to which the mind is attached, becomes active. Caraka says: मनःपुरःसराणीन्द्रियाण्यग्रहणसमर्थानि भवन्ति (Sutra-sthanam. 8.4). "The senses become capable of seizing their respective objects only when they are led by the mind". It appears from an analysis of the ancient medical literature that hrdaya is the chief instrument in all kinds of sense-impressions. But hrdaya being only an organ, must be activated by something, which is of the nature of energy. This energy is supplied by manas, which is seated in the hrdaya. Hrdaya is pressed into activity by the likes and dislikes of the manas.

There are innumerable passages in Caraka, Susruta and Bhela, where the seat of mind has been identified with hrdaya. This is very appropriate, because while mind being उभयात्मक is karta, the hrdaya is its karana; and the two always go together. Susruta in Sarira-sthanam, 3.18 writes हृदयं ... बुद्धेर्मनसश्च स्थानत्वात् —the hrdaya is the seat of intellect and mind. In Sutra-sthanam, 30.2. Caraka writes,

आत्मा च सगुणश्चेतश्चिन्तय हृदिसंस्थितम्

The soul as invested with attributes, the mind and thoughts are established in the hrdaya. Bhela in Cikitsa-sthanam. ch. 8, p. 149, writes

कारणं सर्वबुद्धीनां चित्तं हृदयसंस्थितम् ।

क्रियानांचैत्यनांच चित्तं सर्वस्यकारणम् ॥ (18)

"Mind, the reason of all sorts of intellect, is situated in



the hrdaya. Mind is only the cause of all actions". Bhela writes once again,

शिरस्ताल्यन्तर्गतं सर्वेन्द्रिय परं मनः । (19)

मनस्ताल्यन्तराश्रितम् । हृदि सन्तिष्ठते चित्तं बुद्धिः सर्वेन्द्रियम् ॥ (20)

(Ch. 5 p. 294)

"Mind is situated between the skull and the palate. Mind, intellect and all senses exist in the hrdaya". Bhela uses the word citta in both citations as synonymous with manas. The Kasyapa-samhita similarly writes,

हृदयात् संप्रवर्तन्ते मनःपूर्वाणि देहिनाम् ।

इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियवश्चौद्धा .. हितम् ॥ (21)

(Phakha Ch. 6)

"Mind along with the organs of senses, originates from the hrdaya of living beings".

The foregoing analysis of the seat of manas must have made it clear what a great part is played by both manas and hrdaya in all aesthetic experience. Though the two function jointly, it appears that the earlier writers, like Bharata and the early systems of philosophy, like the Abhidhamma, prefer manas, and the later Alamkarikas would have hrdaya substituted for manas. Bharata repeatedly says that Rasa-realisation is always of one who is sumannasa, and the Abhidhamma philosophy sharply distinguishes sumanassa from dumanassa. But later Alamkarikas turn away from manas, and emphasize the role of hrdaya. But this is a distinction without a difference. All later Alamkarikas hold that Rasa-realisation is of the Sahrdaya. Abhinavagupta writes of Rasa-realisation as hrdaya-sambada (Abhinava-Bharati, vol. I. p. 292.); Mammata speaks of "Sakala-sahrdaya-samvada-bhaja", showing thereby the great importance of the concept of hrdaya as the seat of sensory organs in aesthetic analyses.

## II

The contact of indriya with indriyārtha, comprehending all kinds of sense-knowledge, is ahara. In Sec. 1, the organs

and their instruments used in all such ahara, have been discussed. Caraka in Sutra-sthanam. 28. 5, includes under ahara, sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa and gandha. Caraka takes over the speculations of Samkhya, which again are very close to panca-dvara-vinnana of Abhidhamma philosophy. He says further that health is the result of proper ahara, just as disease arises out of improper and unsuitable ahara. Caraka writes, विविधमाशितं पीतं लीढं खादितं जन्तोर्हितम् । .. .केवलं शरीरमुपचयवल्-वर्णसुखायुषा योजयति धातुर्जयति । (22)

Wholesome food thus contributes to health. Again the body or deha being the result of ahara, the careful man should select proper diet.

न रागान्नापि विज्ञानादाहारानुपयोजयेत् ।

परीक्ष्य हितमश्रीयाद्देहो ह्याहारसम्भवः ॥ (23)

(Caraka Sutras 28.22)

Caraka lays very great emphasis on ahara. He writes that diseases are all the outcome of unsuitable diet. Caraka writes:

आहारप्रभवं वस्तु रोगाश्चाहारसम्भवः ।

हिताहितविशेषाच्च विशेष सुखदुःखयोः ॥ (24)

(Sutra 28.25)

Everything is rooted in ahara; and diseases are the result of ahara. These, in their turn, give rise to pleasure and pain. Caraka says further, as he analyses the causes of diseases: एवमिदं शरीरमशितलीढपीतखादितप्रभवमशितखादित-पीत-लीढ-प्रभवाश्च शरीरेऽस्मिन् व्याधयो भवन्ति । (Sutra. 28.3).<sup>25</sup> He holds that contact with unsuitable sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa and gandha along with changes of seasons and parinam, may be the cause of diseases (Sutra. 28.5). In Sutra-sthanam, 28.3. Caraka says that Rasa is rooted in ahara. आहारमूलाभ्यां रसः ।

It appears from the foregoing analyses that disease and health are both dependent on ahara. Caraka writes, if for any reason there is an increase or decay of Rasa in the body, the remedy is to diminish or augment the Rasa by appropriate ahara; and thus to reach a balance between all these different Rasas. The principle of achieving a balance through the

opposites applies equally to the kitta part of the body (See Ch. X).

निमित्तस्तु क्षीणमिवृद्धानां प्रसादाख्यानां वृद्धिक्षयाभ्यामाहारमूलाभ्यां एव साम्यमुत्पादयत्यारोग्याय किद्वच मलानामेव । (26)

(Sutra. 28.3). It will be seen how achievement of balance (See Ch. X) through the union of opposites (See Ch. IX), is at the root of Rasa-realisation. It is important to note here that ahara helps in the achievement of this balance between different sarira and manasa Rasas.

The Abhidhamma philosophy which is close to Samkhya speculations also recognises the object-subject relation, or Arammana-paccaya. This object-subject relation in orthodox Samkhya, becomes the concept of ahara.\* Arammana in the Abhidhamma philosophy means the "object" of cognition. Arammana-paccaya is therefore a kind of relation, in which the paccaya-Dhamma is an "object" of the Paccayuppana, which must necessarily be a type of consciousness or a psychic factor. All the types of consciousness, all the psychic factors, all kinds of material qualities, and all the concepts may come as the Paccaya-Dhamma in this relation. In other words, all these may be the objects of cognition.

There is, in fact, not a single thing which does not become an Arammana of consciousness and the psychic factors. Thus it may be of six kinds, namely, visible Arammana, audible Arammana, odorous Arammana, sapid Arammana, tangible Arammana, and cognisable Arammana. These are the six kinds of the "objects" of consciousness (Abhidhamma Philosophy vol. 1, Bk. I, ch. III. 5, XIX). All these are alambana. Bharata's discussion of alambana vibhava takes note of the first two objects of cognition; for the objects of kavya and rupaka are sravya and drsya. Bharata's exclusion of odorous Arammana, sapid Arammana and tangible Arammana is explained by the fact that these organs do not exist in the Rupa world. These belong to the world of Kama (Abhidhamma Philosophy, vol. I. Bk. I. Ch. III. 6 XXIV).

In Bharata's Rasa-analysis, attention should then be confined to visible Arammana, and audible Arammana. These

\* It might be of interest to note that the word "aesthetics" comes from a Greek root,  $\epsilon \sigma \theta \iota \omega$  meaning "to eat". Ruskin takes the word aesthetics to mean simple sensuous impressions, without any super-imposition of thought

two belong to the world of Rupa. But Rupa (matter) means the whole aggregate of material qualities, while Nama (sensations) includes the four psychic aggregates (Vedana, Sanna, Samkhara, and Vinnana), and Nibbana. A man's good and bad activities (Sankhara) of one life determine the type of his birth, his mental disposition, and all his resultant consciousness (vipaka) in the next (i.e. his vinnana). This gives rise to the mental and the physical states (Nama-Rupa) in his new life, according to its own nature. Depending on these, he gets the six Ayatana, namely eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind (Salayatana). Depending on the six Ayatana, he gets a contact (Phassa) with the object of cognition. Contact means feeling (Vedana). Feeling gives rise to craving (tanha), and that to grasping (upadana), which keeps on the process of life (bhava).

Bhava thus comes a long way after Phassa, or ahara. Without phassa, there cannot be any vedana; then no Tanha, then no upadana; then no Bhava, then no Jati, then no Jara-Marana-Soka-Parideva-Dukkha-Domanassa-payasa. This is Nibbana, the cessation of all evils.

Phassa with visible Arammana and audible Arammana (Vibhava) gives rise, according to Abhidhamma analysis, to Vedana (feeling). This vedana in its turn, gives rise to Tanha (craving) and Upadana (grasping). This sets into motion Bhava, which is characterised by tanha and upadana. Tanha is characterised by Rajas, as upadana is by Tamas. So Bhava or the struggle and process of life, is also characterised by these two qualities.

The Abhidhamma analysis of bhava or the rise of the processes of life is very close to the Patanjala analysis of it. Caraka in Sutra-sthanam. 25. 13, writes,

येषामेवहि भवानां सम्पत् संजनयेन्नरम् ।

तेषामेव व्यापद्ब्याधीन् विविचान् समुदोस्येत् ॥ (27)

Just as the unbalance of certain bhavas (atman, manas, Rasa, Saddhatu, parents, Karma, Swabhava, Prajapati and Kala) gives rise to man, so also the unbalance of these bhavas, gives rise to diseases. At the question of what contributes to the development of purusa and of diseases, Atreya replied proper diet sustains the development of the purusa, just as improper food aggravates disease. (Sutra.

25. 14). Atreya in discussing the question says that proper food restores the bodily balance. यदाहारजातमग्निवेश समाश्चैव शरीरधातून् प्रकृतीस्थापयति, विषमांश्च समीकरोत्येतद् हितं विद्धि। (28) (Sutra. 25. 16).

This applies equally to the restoration of the balance of Samana dhatu, as also to the balance of Visama dhatu. Diseases arising out of असात्म्येन्द्रियार्थ-संयोग, are rooted in ahara ; Caraka says, रोगाश्चाहार सम्भवः (29) (Sutra. 28. 15). So also bodies are dependent on, and spring out of ahara— देहो ह्याहार सम्भवः। (30) (Sutra. 28. 12). It appears that disease and body in Caraka belong to the same category as "bhava" in Yoga-sutra. The Yoga-sutra writes, भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम्। (I. 19). The word "bhava" has been variously explained. Vacaspati Misra explains "bhava" as avidya or ignorance. Bhojaraaja explains it as Samsara or creation. The ancient literature of the Buddhists writes, "bhava-paccaya jati", or the determining cause of life is this relation with bhava. So the cause of birth, rooted in ignorance, is "bhava". This is very similar to the Abhidhamma concept of bhava as giving rise to the processes of life.

Bharata's concept of "bhava" seems to have been deeply influenced by Abhidhamma speculations, as also by Patanjala analysis. Bharata explains "bhava" as "bhava-yantitl bhavah". Again कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन् भाव उच्यते। (VII. 2 Banaras ed.). *Anything which comes into being is "bhava"*. This is also the connotation of "bhava" in Abhidhamma system. Bharata recognises several types of "bhava" in order of their appearance.

The nature of bhava, which is tinged with Rajas and Tamas, and its purification leading to the emergence of Rasa, are to be discussed in fuller detail in Chs. X and XI. It is to be clearly recognised that bhava arises out of ahara, or contact with outside world. This concept of ahara along with the analysis of purification, form the common basis of Abhidhamma system, Patanjala philosophy, and Bharata. The common basis of the speculations of Ayurveda and Bharata may be further worked out. It should be noticed that this basis is the Samkhya system, and the concept of

three gunas. There is pralaya when the gunas are balanced ; creation is the result of the gunas in an unbalanced state. All things are divided in Samkhya analysis into three categories, Sattvic, Rajasic and Tamasic. Sarira (body), indriyas (senses), visaya (objects) are similarly divided into these categories, on account of this difference in constituents, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The predominantly Sattvic purusa prefers Sattvic objects and rejects Rajasa and Tamasa objects. Similarly, the predominantly Rajasa purusa prefers Rajasa objects, and rejects Sattvic and Tamasa things. So it is the case with the preferences and avoidances of a predominantly Tamasa man. The predominantly Sattvic objects are thus naturally dear to the Sattvic purusa ; so Rajasa and Tamasa objects are naturally dear to Rajasic and Tamasic purusas. The Bhagavad-Gita in Ch. 18 discusses this question. The Gita also looks at ahara as threefold, or Sattvic, Rajasic and Tamasic. Ahara means here aharana or gathering. Whatever the indriyas gather is known as ahara. The gathering of visual impression by the eye, of the audible impression by the ear, or of the taste impression by tongue, all these are different forms of ahara. The predominantly Sattvic purusa would thus prefer Sattvic ahara. This preference is because of the peculiar constitution of the citta of a particular purusa. Citta-sattva is naturally of a Sattvic nature, though at the same time, it is charged with Rajas and Tamas. So the preference of Rajas ahara by a Rajasa purusa, and the preference of Tamas ahara by a Tamasa purusa, are explained. All ahara nourishes citta-sattva. But ahara not merely nourishes citta-sattva ; it nourishes the body, and the indriyas as well. The body and the indriyas are satisfied with all such aharas ; and with the satisfaction of the body, the soul is also set at rest. The importance of the maintenance of health occupy a very large place in all religious practices. The medical literature of the Hindus does not look at the maintenance of health as an end in itself. Caraka in Sutrasthanam, Ch. 11, discusses the three coveted ends of life. These are (1) Pranai-sana, (2) Dhanai-sana, and (3) Paralokai-sana. These three are interdependent. While the subject-matter of medicine is the maintenance of life or Prana, the analysis of bhavas and rasas properly speaking, comes under the third. The concepts of bhava (See Chs. 11

and XI), *vasana* and *sthayi-bhava* (See Chs. VI and XI) and of *rasa* (See Ch. IX) would be unintelligible to those, who do not believe in *Paralokai-sana*. In discussing *pranai-sana*, Caraka has to discuss *rtu-charyya* and *dina-charyya* (Sutra-sthanam. Chs. VI, VII). *Susruta* devotes one chapter (Sutra-sthanam. Ch. VI) to the discussion of *rtu-charyya*. *Rtu-charyya* and *dina-charyya* by maintaining the health of the body, will help regain mental balance. The chapters on *Sadacara* (*Amrita-Karana-Visranti* Ch. 18), and *Rtu-charyya* (*Ibid.* Ch. 19) in the *Ananda-Kandam* (Tanjore *Saraswati Mahal Series*) should be consulted.\* It explains how sweet, acid and other physiological *Rasas* by nourishing the body and senses, contribute to the development of the *citta-sattva*, as *sringara* and *karuna* and other mental *Rasas* by nourishing the *citta-sattva*, also maintain the balanced health of the body. This is quite appropriate, for the early *Samkhya* and the *Buddhist* analyses equally recognise how body and mind are dependent on each other. This is evident from Caraka, as also from the *Abhidhamma* analysis. Caraka in *Sarira-sthanam*, 4. 16, writes, *Sattvamca Sariramanu-bidheeyate, Sariramca Sattvam. The Abhidhamma* philosophy recognises the same position in its concept of *nama-rupa*.

*Bharata's Rasa-sutra*, *vibhava-anubhava-vyabhichari-samyogena Rasa-nishpatti* would assume the following form, when looked at from the standpoint of *Samkhya* analysis.

#### Vyabhicharibhava (physical manifestation)

Indriyarthā	Indriya	Manas	Buddhi	Atman.
Vibhava	Anubhava (mental manifestation)			

It should be noted that this pattern applies equally to *Sarira Rasa* as also to *Manasa rasa*. The *indriyarthā* in the case of poetry and drama, assumes diverse forms of sight and sound. The *indriyarthā* in the case of cooking (an analogy of which *Bharata* is very fond) is one of the six *Rasas*. Both are forms of *ahara*. The *Indriya* obviously differs in the two cases; in the first case, these are eye and ear. In the

\* The importance of body in *Yoga*, *Tantra* and in the speculation of the *Rasa-siddhas* cannot be exaggerated. The body occupies an equally important place in many schools of *Buddhism*, like the *Vajra-yana*.

second, it is the tongue. Caraka says that indriyas without the manas cannot perceive anything. मनःपुरःसराणीन्द्रियाण्यर्धग्रहण समर्थानि भवन्ति । (Sutra. 8. 4.)". It has already been noticed that this manas receives all sense-impressions. Bharata's recognition that the appreciator or spectator of poetry and drama should be "Samanassa" points to the same conclusion.

The affiliation of Bharata's Rasa-speculations to the Samkhya scheme is so close that all different stages of his Rasa-analysis, seem to have been deeply influenced by it. The different stages of Bharata's Rasa-analysis are vibhava, anubhava, vyabhicharibhava and sattvikabhava. Each of these stages deserves careful and close examination. While indriyārtha in the form of vibhava is āhara, the manifestation of those vibhavas in the physical body, takes the form of vyabhicharibhava. But vyabhicharibhava is only the outward expression of what is already present in the mind. This last has been carefully analysed in Bharata under anubhava. The gulf between indriyārtha and indriya is bridged by vayu. Sattvikabhava which is posterior to vibhava and anterior to vyabhicharibhava, seems to be very largely dominated by vayu. The implication of this dominance of vayu in Sattvikabhava is to be discussed in fuller detail in Ch. VII.

Bharata's discussion of vibhava as a form of āhara, seems also to follow the analysis of Sat-siddhi in Samkhya philosophy. Barring a few instances in the Yukti-dīpikā, the concept of sat-siddhi does not occur elsewhere in any other existing treatise of Samkhya. It refers to the six kinds of spiritual power, and these are (1) power of will (samkalpa-siddhi), (2) power of vision (dṛiṣṭi-siddhi), (3) power of speech (vak-siddhi), (4) power of touch by hand (hasta-siddhi), (5) power of clasping (asleṣa-siddhi), and (6) power of mutual friction (dwanda-siddhi). At the beginning of creation, when Sattva was abundant, an embodied self of that period used to have the spiritual power of will (samkalpa-siddhi), by the application of which he could produce an offspring. The progeny or bhava at that time was born by a mere fiat of will without having recourse to any sexual union. Numerous instances of this type of creation are recorded in the Vedas, Puranas and other scriptural texts. With the decay of spiritual power, the creation of embodied beings was



determined by grosser forms of union. Thus in the next stage, an offspring was produced by wistful amorous glances of the parents. This still survives, says the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*, in the biological order. For instance, the female tortoise conceives by casting a glance at the male partner without recourse to any gross sexual union. This has been called in the *Yukti-dīpikā*, *dristi-siddhi*. The *Yukti-dīpikā* writes (p. 143-4) : यत्तु (क) चक्षुषि निरीक्षितेनाण्ड धारणं करोति ; प्रियं स्वल्पं चक्षुषा निरीक्ष्य कृतार्थमात्मानं मन्यते ।

In the third place, with the loss of this power, one issue was born by mere utterance of an expression like "let us have a child". This also survives in the lower biological order, as the female conch conceives an issue by uttering a shrill sound. The *Samkhya Bhasya*, B.S. II. 1. 25 writes, "the female crane conceives from hearing the roaring of thunder" : वलाका च स्तनयित्रखभ्रवणाद् गर्भं धरते ।

Even in the higher order of biological creation, we see that a glance at the beloved and consequent conversation on an object of love cause delight. The *Yukti-dīpikā* writes (p. 144) : तस्यामपि क्षीणायां वाक्सिद्धिर्बभूव । अभिभाष्य प्राणिनो यदिच्छन्ति तदापादयन्ति । तदद्याप्यनुवर्त्तते, यच्छस्त्री विरुतेनापत्यं विभक्तिं । प्रियं स्वल्पं सम्भाष्य महतीं प्रीतिमतुभवति । (33)

It should be noted that the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* notes both forms of ahara, which form the basis of Bharata's *Rasa*-speculations. "Anda-dharana" or "apatya" are forms of bhava, as has already been noticed in Buddhist "bhava-paccya jati". This bhava is the result of ahara, gathered through the eye and the ear. The passage in the *Yukti-dīpikā* describing the different forms of ahara, is close to Caraka's analysis of ahara. Bharata's concept of bhava as arising out of vibhava-vibhabena ahrita (Ch. 7. Sl. 1. Banaras ed.) is to be read against the background of Samkhya analysis of sense knowledge.

In thus tracing the evolution of both sarira and manas Rasas to ahara, the writers on *Alamkara* and *Ayurveda* were only following the fundamental tenet of Samkhya system, that all Rasas are rooted in ahara. Caraka writes, ahara-mulabhyam Rasa ; the *Yoga-Sutra* is careful in prescribing appropriate diet at the time of Yogic practice. The *Yoga* system recognises three different types of ahara for the

Yogin. These are hita, mita, and medhya. The Gheranda-Samhita and the Silva-samhita analyse these different ahara. The food which contributes to the health of the body, is known as hitahara. The food when taken, gladdens the body and cheers the soul, is known as mitahara. The medhyahara is that which stimulates the sattvic element in the mind, and expressive faculties of the senses. This last is obviously the best. It might be of interest to note the ideal diet prescribed for the Yogin in the Gheranda Samhita.

शान्त्यन्नं यवपिंडं वा गोधूमपिंडकं तथा ।

मुदगयुषं कालकादि शुभ्रं च तुषवर्जितम् ॥

पटोलं पनसंचैव ककूलं च सुकाशकम् ।

द्राढिका कर्कटौ रम्भा डुम्बुरं च सुकण्टकम् ॥

... .. :

लघुपाकं प्रियं स्निग्धं यथा वा धातुपोषणम् ।

मनोऽभिलषितं योगी दिव्यं भोजनमाचरेत् ॥ (34)

These recipes are required for the proper discharge of the Yogin's activities. These will help him in attaining the frame of mind, which is the first requisite for yogic practices. Caraka is also very clear on the necessity of having proper diet for the maintenance of the health of body and mind. In Sutra-sthanam, 27. 2. Caraka writes,

इष्टवर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शं विधिविहितमन्नपानं प्राणिनां प्राणिसंज्ञकानां प्राणमाचक्षते कुशलाः । प्रत्यक्षफलदर्शनात् तदिन्धनात् ह्यन्तर्येऽस्थितिः । तत् सत्त्वमुज्ज्वयति, तच्छरीरधातुव्यूहवर्णोन्मिद्रियप्रसादकरम् यथोक्तमुपसेव्यमानम् । विपरीतमहिताय सम्पद्यते ।

The colour, smell, taste and touch of these food, which are universally agreeable are the source of life or "prana" of all animals. These include creatures, animate and inanimate, man and even trees. .... With proper food, the mind is strengthened, and it nourishes the physical elements of the body, and satisfies the senses. The stand-points of the Yogic texts on ahara, and of Caraka are not essentially different from that of Bharata. Bharata equally recognises the imperative need of ahara being hita, so that the reader of kavya or the spectator of nataka, might become "somanassa". Bharata in Ch. 22. Sl. 90 (Vol. III G.O.S.) emphasizes

that the ahara brought in by all five senses, should be 'ista'. If on the other hand, the ahara be anista (Ch. 22. Sl. 91) and madhyastha (Ch. 22. Sl. 92), the spectator can never become 'Samanassa', one of the two primary requisites for proper aesthetic enjoyment (vide Ch. V).

If the evolution of Rasa must depend ultimately on the nature of food taken in through the senses, the question arises how this food undergoes a transformation and a change. The food, which can be taken in by the mouth, or the eye and the ear, goes to build up both body and soul. The Chandogyia Upanishad is very definite on this point. The great importance of food in the building of body and mind has been beautifully analysed in the story of Swetaketu, told in the Chandogyia 6. 7. 1—6. 10. 3. After going without food for fifteen days, Swetaketu when asked by his father to recite the Vedas, could not remember them. But on taking food, his memory revived, and he could recite all these. In 6. 6. 5, the Chandogyia writes, अन्तमयं हि सौम्य मनः आपीमयः प्रणस्तेजमयी वागिति भूय एव मा भगवान् विश्वापयत्विति तथा सोम्येति होवाच । (36)

The manas is thus being moulded by the kind of food that is taken in through the indriyas. In 6. 8. 3-6, Swetaketu repeats the question, "What is the origin of this body?" The father replied, "The origin of body is in the food that is taken in". तस्यकमूलं स्यादन्यत्रन्नादेवमेव खलु सौम्य ।

So the origin of Rasa as depending on the sensory impressions is not peculiar to Bharata alone. It is as old as the Upanishads, and has been developed in different directions in Alamkara and Ayurveda.

All aharas are the result of the atman acting in the capacity as Vaisvanara. The Mandukya-Upanishad speaks of how the sentient soul, which is Vaisvanara, becomes aware of the outside world. It is the first stage of the evolution of soul, corresponding to the Vibhavas, which are forms of ahara in Indian speculations. The Mandukya-Upanishad (2. 3) writes, जागर्तिस्थानी वहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्तांग एकोनविंशति-मुखःस्थूलसुक्ष्मश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः ।

But while Vaisvanara is looking out for sensory impressions, the tajjasa division of the soul, which comes after Vaisvanara, rests more on itself. It is less dependent on

the indriyas, and enjoys prajna. स्वप्रस्थानोन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्तांग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः। In the taljasa stage, the soul has travelled beyond mere receiving of sensory impressions. In the third stage, there is susupti. There is no more any hankering or desire for anything. He rests in his sleep, and is without any disturbance. He himself is of the nature of delight, and can enjoy objects of delight without any sense of limitation. This is the prajna stage of the soul.

The difference between bhava and rasa seems to be this. While bhava is catering to the needs of Vaisvanara, which is bahi-prajna, rasa is of the taljasa portion of the soul, which is antara-prajna. Mm. Gangadhara, commenting on "Dirgha-Jivtendriya" (Caraka. Sutra. I. 28) writes how the bhutatman is two-fold, according as the pratyagatman is associated with the gross or subtle body. स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरसत्त्वात्मसमुदायो हि प्रत्यात्मा द्विविधो भूतात्मा वैश्वानरस्तेजसश्चेति The body and the soul being of the nature of ahara, and the taking in of ahara being the peculiar activity of the Vaisvanara, it is of great importance to find out the part played by Vaisvanara in Rasa evolution.

The atman acting in its capacity as Vaisvanara takes in the whole world as its object of enjoyment. Mm. Gangadhara writes, अतस्यन्नं पश्यसि प्रियं भवत्यस्य ब्रह्मवर्चसंकुले, य एवमेवात्मानवैश्वानरमुपास्ते। (37) (Jalpa-kalpa-taru. Calcutta p. 162) But the taljasa atman shows a further refinement. When the vaisvanara atman rests content in its own self, and turns away from outside world, as if lost in sleep, then taljasa atman comes into play. The taljasa atman shows a further refinement, and the play of indriyas stops altogether. Then the senses disappear in the manas, and the manas with its three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas, disappear in the buddhi, and then the buddhi with its anukul and pratiful cognitions, disappears into mahat. So tamas disappears into rajas, and rajas into sattva, and sattva itself disappears in the avyakta. In the third stage of prajna, there is the enjoyment by the Suddha-sattva of this purest delight. The soul at this stage is deeply asleep or in susupti. At this moment, the ahara of Vaisvanara has become the rasa of prajna stage.

The bhutatman which takes in these ahara, is according to Mandukya Upanishad, divisible into two parts, (a) vaisvanara and (b) taijasa. The Chandhyogya Upanishad analyses how all ahara contributes to the development of body and mind. In 6. 5. 1, the Chandhyogya Upanishad writes, अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते, तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तं पुरीषं भवति मध्यमस्तन्मांसं योऽनिष्ठस्तन्मनः । Whatever is taken in divides itself into three parts; and the purest and most refined portion of it goes to replenish manas. In 6. 5. 3, the Chandhyoga speaks similarly of tejas. तेजोऽशितं त्रेधा विधीयते तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तदस्थि भवति यो मध्यमः सः मज्जा योऽनिष्ठः सा वाक् । In 6. 5. 4, the Chandhyogya Upanishad sums up the position by saying, that the manas is entirely dependent on annas or ahara. अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजमयी वागिति भूय एव सा भगवान् विज्ञापयस्विति । (38) This anna or food on dividing itself into three parts, contributes to the development of manas, prana and vak. (6. 6. 5). The manas which is annamaya, does thus belong to the category of anna-brahma. In analysing the concept of anna-brahma, the Chandhyogya writes (7. 9. 1) that without anna, one loses sight, hearing or mind. The Chandhyogya again points out (7. 10. 1-4; 7. 11. 1-2) that apa and vak are superior to anna, though these latter would have been impossible without anna.

### III

Caraka in the passage from Sutra-sthanam 27.2, discussed in Sec. II, speaks of varna, gandha, rasa, sparsa as 'anna' or ahara. In Cikitsa-sthanam 28.4, Caraka finds the seat of prana-vayu in the five sense-organs, so that without this prana-vayu, there cannot be any kind of cognition. The prana vayu alone can bring in sensory impressions.

It should be clearly understood that the Samkhya system recognises that nothing absolutely new is produced. Effect is the developed stage of what was previously latent. It is the manifestation of the implicit—Suksmanam murti-labha karyam. (Yukti-dipika, p. 31). The oil already exists in the sesamum; it is to be extracted by pressing; rice exists in the paddy, and husking is required to bring it out. It is

found that the effect or form is already immanent in the material cause, and efficient causes such as pressing and husking etc., can only help it to reveal itself. The manifestation of the unmanifest is creation; the disappearance of the manifest into the unmanifested state is destruction. There is nothing in the universe which is absolutely new creation, or total destruction. Creation means that the unmanifest becomes charged with Rajas or Tamas. The infinite array of creation is the result of the infinite possible combinations of these three gunas, as also of the five primary elements—panca-bhautikopadana. The difference between different things may thus be either a difference in constituents or in qualities. The difference may again arise from a cause which is altogether different from the one, just discussed. It is how the one and the same thing may appear as different, when taken in through different senses. In other words, if the same thing be the ahara of two different senses, how should it be described, or what should be its connotation? Most physical things have an appeal to two or more senses. The same thing might have now a visual appearance, when taken in through the eyes; when felt with the skin, it will have a tactual appeal; and when taken in through the ears, the same thing will have audible appearance. But it is one thing all the same. In fact, the same object is now visual, now tactual and now again audible. It is different because it is being taken in through the different senses. The different *grahaka indriyas* are always giving different forms and shapes to the self-same things. *Sringara* and *Madhura* are one and the same; *Hasa* and *Amla* are one. The thing when taken in through the mouth appears as *madhura*; the same thing when taken in through the eyes and ears, and brought to the mind, appears as *Sringara*. It applies equally to *Amla* and *Hasa*. It is to be noted that it is the same thing, which when taken in through the mouth appears as *madhura* and *amla*, will appear at the next moment as *Sringara* and *Hasa*, when taken in through the eyes and ears. This philosophic standpoint knits together the two sister speculations of *Ayurveda* and *Alamkara*.

A comparison of the features of *Sringara* with *Madhura*, or *Hasa* with *Amla*, will reveal the truth of this contention. It is to be noted that the features of the first

six Rasas in Bharata correspond very closely to the characters of the six Rasas in Caraka and Susruta. Bharata thrice refers to Sringara as madhura. First in speaking of the anubhavas of Sringara, Bharata writes, नयनचातुर्यप्रविक्षेपकटाक्ष-संचारललितमधुरांगहारवाक्यादिमिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः ।

Again in Ch. 6, sl. 48, Bharata writes,

नयनवदनप्रसादेः स्मित मधुरवचोद्धृतिप्रमोदैश्च ।

मधुरश्चांग विकारैस्तस्याभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः ॥ (39)

The 'prasada' of Sringara referred to by Bharata has been mentioned by Caraka as peculiar to Madhura—Sadindriya-prasadana (Sutra. 26.41). Caraka speaks of madhura as "Sthayiriyakara" and Bharata speaks of Sringara as fostering dhriti. Bharata goes further in identifying the characteristics of Sringara with those of madhura. In Sutra-sthanam. 26.42, Caraka speaks of sthauilyam mardabamalasya-matiswapnam gaurabamannabhilasamagnidaurbalyam-asya-kanthayor-mamsa-avivridhim तथा . . . . . samjnaswara-pranasa-gala-ganda . . . . . lityavam pravrittin kaphajan vyadhinapadayati<sup>40</sup>. Bharata in describing the vipralambha of Sringara, writes, nirveda-glani-samkasuya . . . . nidra-suptaswapna- vibhoka-vyadhi- unmadapasmara- jadyamara-nadi-bhlanubhavai-abhineta<sup>41</sup>. All these are the characteristic marks of Sringara. The man affected with Sringara shows all the characteristics of a man affected with madhura. In both cases, these are idleness (alasya and nirveda), dreaming (swapna and nidra), and loss of consciousness (samjnaswara - nasa and vyadhi - unmada - apasmara - jadyamarandhi etc.).

If it be true that Sringara and Madhura are one and the same thing, appearing differently because of the difference of grahaka sense-organs, it is equally true of Hasa and Amla. Abhinavagupta in discussing Hasa compares it with the physical taste of acidity (Natya-sastra, G.O.S. I, 314). Hemachandra in exact agreement with Abhinavagupta, holds that the taste of Hasa and the taste of acid are the same (Kavyanusasana. N. Sagar. p. 90). A detailed comparison of the attending effects of these two will reveal that these two Rasas are the same, though appearing different, because of the difference in perceiving sense organs.

Bharata in Ch. 6. sl. 55 (Banaras ed.) describes Hasa as follows :

उत्फुल्लानन्नेत्रैस्तु गंढैर्विहसितैरथ ।

किंचिल्लक्षितदन्तं च हसितं तद्विधीयते ॥ (42)

Cheerful face and gleaming eyes, slightly visible teeth characterise the laughing man. Caraka in Sutra-sathanam. 26.44 also speaks sammilayatyaksinee and dantaharsa while describing Hasa. A restlessness, which speaks of the presence of Rajas, characterises all the anubhavas of Hasa. These anubhavas are according to Bharata, tasyausthadamsana - nasakapola - spandana - dristivyakosa-akuncana-swedasyaraga - parsagrahanadi - bhiraunbhavalrabhinaya prayoktabya. Caraka also holds that amla Rasa is predominantly agneya in character, and increases pitta (Sutra. 26.44). This again is of the nature of Rajas; and so the constituents of Hasa and Amla are very much alike. Susruta also holds that acid helps digestion because of its fiery nature. PacaytyagneyaswabHAVat paridahati kanthamuro hrdayamcheti (Sutra-sathanam. 42.10).

Bharata repeatedly speaks of the watery eye and the inflated nose of a laughing man.

अस्थानहसितं यत्र सास्त्रनेत्रं तथैव च ।

उत्कम्प्यतांसकशिरस्तच्चापहसितं भवेत् ॥

संरब्धं सास्त्रनेत्रं च विक्रुष्टस्वरमुद्धतम् ।

करोपगुटपाश्वं च तच्चातिहसितं भवेत् ॥ (43)

The restlessness of Hasa, the shaking of head and of limbs, and laughter holding both its sides—all these are the manifestations of Rajasic elements in Hasa. Saradatanaya in Bhava-prakasa p. 44, also holds that there is predominance of Rajas in Hasa. From the foregoing analysis, it must have been noticed that the constituents and after-effects of Hasa and Amla are the same.

Bharata speaks of alasya-avahithya-tandra-nidra-swapna-probodhasuya (Banaras ed. p. 74) as the vyabhi-charibhavas of Hasa. These reactions appear to be very different from the ones just cited. The difference is to be explained, as Caraka says, from the amount of acid, with which the man is treated. The appropriate amount of acid



will strengthen and stimulate the senses ; there shall be watering of the mouth, and agni or fire shall be well-sustained. अम्लोरसो तक्तं रोचयत्यग्निं दीपयति देहं बृंहयत्युर्जयति मनो बोधयतीन्द्रियाणि दृढीकरोति वलचवद्धयति, वातमनुलोमयति हृदयं तर्पयत्यास्य-मास्नावसति ... (Sutra. 26.43).“ All these correspond to the anubhavas of Hasa, as analysed by Bharata. But there will be different reactions if this acid be taken in excess. These are according to Caraka, दन्तान् हर्षयतितर्पयति संमीलयत्य-क्षिणीं संवोजयति रोमाणि कफं विलाययति.....रक्तं द्रपयति, मांसं विदहति, कायं शिथिलीकरोति..... (Sutra 26. 44) (45)

These become in Bharata, *alasyavahitya-tandra-nidra-swapna* etc. It will be seen how closely does Bharata follow Ayurvedic speculations.

The striking similarity between Hasa and Amla does not end here. Bharata speaks of a six-fold division of hasa. (6.51b, Banaras ed.). Susruta in Uttaratantira, 63.5, also speaks of a six-fold division of amla. It might be of interest to note further that the dasavastha of Sringara in Bharata (Banaras ed. p. 73), might have been influenced by the ten fold division of Madhura in Susruta (Uttara-tantra. 63. 5).

That this is no idle guess will be appreciated, when it is remembered that Hemacandra in Kavyanusasana, compares Hasa with amla-dadima. In p. 90 (Nir. Sagar ed. 1934), Hemacandra describe Hasa as follows : यथा अम्लदड़िमादिरसास्वादोऽन्यत्रापि दन्तोदकविकारानुरूपदर्शनात् संक्रमणस्वभावः, तथाहासोऽपि संक्रामति, काव्ये ।

Abhinavagupta similarly holds in Abhinava-Bharati (G.O.S. V. 1. p. 316) यथा म्लदाड़िमादिरसास्वादः संक्रमणमावोऽन्यत्रापि दन्तोदकविकारानुरूपसंक्रमदर्शनादेव संक्रामति ।

Both Abhinavagupta and Hemacandra are agreed that Hasa and Amla are very similar in their after-effects.

So deep-rooted is the philosophic basis of this problem, and so close is the resemblance between the Rasas in Bharata and their counterparts in Ayurveda, that any superficial examination will at once reveal the identity of the two. This could never have been accidental, and Bharata seems to have consciously drawn upon the speculations of the Ayurveda. Bharata speaks of the following anubhavas of

... upatana-paridevana-mukhasashana-  
vaivarna-srastagatrata-niswasa - smritivilopadibhivanubhaval-  
rabhinaya projoktabya." These anubhavas have been asso-  
ciated with Karuna by all leading writers on Alamkara. But  
it has not been noticed that Susruta in Sutra-sthanam. 42. 11,<sup>3</sup>  
associates gatra-kandu, vaivarna and mukha-paka with an  
excess of salt. Susruta writes, evatyarthama-sevyamana  
gatra-kandu - kothasopha-vaivarna-pumsattva-upaghatendriya-  
upatapan tatha mukha-kshipakam . . . . . pravrittinapadayati.

The parallelism between Karuna and Lavana is not  
confined to anubhavas alone. The vyabhicharibhavas of  
Karuna are strikingly similar to the after-effects of a treat-  
ment with salt. Bharata refers to the following vyabhichari-  
bhavas of Karuna. These are nirveda, glani, moha, visada,  
dainya, jadata, unmada and apasmara. These are compar-  
able to the after-effects of a treatment with an excess of salt.  
Caraka in Sutra-sthanam, 26.46, writes, sa evam guno-  
apyekaevatyarthanupa-yuyjyamanas pittam kopayati,  
raktam vardhayati, tarsayati, murchayati, mohayati,  
tapayati, darayati- . . . . pumsttvamupahanti Indriyanya-  
uparunadhi." Swooning (murcha) and stupor (moha, jadata)  
are present equally in karuna and lavana.

The points of similarity between Raudra and Katu  
(astringent) are again very striking. The Karyas or attendant  
effects of Raudra, are according to Bharata, tadana-patana-  
pidana-cchedana-bhedana-praharana . . . . karyani. Caraka  
writes in Sutra-sthanam. 26. 47, sneha-sweda-kleda-malanu-  
pathanti, rochayatyananam, kandam vilalayati . . . krimin  
hinasti, mamsam vilekhayati, soneta-samghatam vinatti, van-  
dhanschinatti, margam vivrinoti, slesmanam samayati, laghu-  
usna ruksmascha. Susruta also says of astringent : Sthauli-  
alasyakapha-krimi-visaikustha-kandu-prasamana Sandhivan-  
dha-vicchedano-avasadana sthanya-sutra-medasam-upahanta  
ceti. The adverse effects of Raudra on mind and astringent  
on body are very similar.

The anubhavas of Raudra also seem to follow very  
closely the attendant after-effects of a treatment with astring-  
ent. Caraka speaks of the following after effects of a treat-  
ment with astringents. Vaktram sodhayati, agnim deepayati,  
bhuktam soshayati, gbranam-asravayati, cakkhu-virechayati,  
sputikaroti-indriyani (Sutra. 26. 47).<sup>4</sup> Bharata writes, rakta-

nayana . . . . . bhrukuti - kara-dantaustha-pidana-ganda-sphurana-hastagra-nishpesadibhl-ranubhavai-vabhinaya prayoktabya.<sup>49</sup> Of these rakta-nayana corresponds to Caraka's cakkhu-virechayati, while the rest come under Caraka's sputi-karoti-Indriyanl. Bharata's kara-dantaustha-pidana-ganda-sphurana is again very close to Susruta's kara-charana-parsa-prabhitisu cha vata-sulanapadayati.

So close and conscious are Bharata's borrowings from the Ayurveda that the parallelism of the vyabhicharibhavas of Raudra extends even to the after-effects of a treatment with an excess of astringent. The vyabhicharibhavas of Raudra are, according to Bharata, sammoha, abega, capalata, augra, sweda, vepathu, romanca and gadagada. Caraka holds that there is an excess of vayu in astringent rasa, and an excess of astringent will bring about diseases of vayu. apicha vayvagnl-gunavahulyayat bhrama-mada-vamathu-kampa-toda-bhedaiscarana-bhuja-piluprista-parsa-prabhitisu marutajan vikaran upajanayati (Sutra-sthanam. 26.48)<sup>50</sup>. It should be clearly noted that of the ten vyabhichari-bhavas of Raudra noted by Bharata (Banaras ed. p. 76), the last four are sattvika-bhavas, and as such, share the characteristic effects of vayu vikara (vide Ch. VII). The rest with their excess of movement show distinct traces of vayu. Abega, capalata, augra and utsaha in Bharata with their restless activities, show the same predominance of vayu in them.

Bharata's Vira and Caraka's Tikta or bitter present the same broad points of resemblance. The vibhavas of Vira according to Bharata are, asam-moha, adhyavasaya etc ; its anubhavas are sthayirya, dhairya and vaisaradya. It is of the nature of utsaha, and works against stupor and frigidity (6.67 Banaras ed.). Both Susruta and Caraka hold that tikta also works against stupor and fainting. Susruta writes in Sutra-sthanam 42.13, tiktaschedano rochana deepana . . . murchajvaraprasamana stanyasodhana . . . vasapayopaso-shamscheti. Bharata's asammoha echoes Susruta's murchajvaraprasamana with reference to bitter. Caraka similarly holds 'that it is visaghna, krimighna, murchadaha-kandukustha trsnaprasamana (Sutra. 26.49). This is not all. The anubhavas of Vira distinctly echo Caraka's analysis of bitter. These anubhavas are sthayirya-dhairya-tyaga-vaisaradyadibhiranubhavairabhinaya prajaktavya. With

Caraka, the anubhavas or after-effects of a treatment with bitter are tvang-mamsayas sthirikarana, jvaraghnā, deepana, pacana, stanya-sodhana lekha. Steadfastness or sthairyakarana characterises both Vira and tikta.

Vaisaradya is again an important anubhava of Vira in Bharata. This corresponds to the cleansing power of bitter, as analysed by Susruta and Caraka. Caraka in Sutra-sthanam 26.49, writes sthanya-sodhana lekha, clearly showing the very great affinity of Raudra with bitter. The vyabhicharibhava of Vira, romanca again shows this close approximation of the two Rasas. Romanca being a sattvikabhava, is dominated by vayu (vide Ch. VII). Bitter in Caraka also shows this predominance of vayu (Sutra-sthanam. 26.50). All these show the very striking points of resemblance between the speculations of Susruta, Caraka and Bharata.

One further point of resemblance between these two kindred speculations might be noted. Caraka in Sutra-sthanam 26.49 and Susruta in Sutra-sthanam, 42.13, speak of a kindling into activity after a course of bitter rasa. This is known as deepana. Abhinavagupta in G.O.S. I.325, holds utsaha and uddipana as the life and soul of Vira.

The parallelism between Bharata's bhayanaka and Caraka's kasaya or insipid deserves to be carefully noted. The anubhavas of bhayanaka are pravepita-kara-carananayana - calana - pulaka - mukha - vaivarna - swarabhedadibhi-ranubhavai-abhinaya prajaktavya. These correspond to Susruta's analysis of the effects produced by insipid rasa. These are manya-sthambha-gatra-sphuranachumuchumayanakunchana-ksanapravrittin janayati (Sutra-sthanam. 42.14).<sup>51</sup> Vaivarnya and Swarabheda are not strictly speaking anubhavas, but are really speaking sattvikabhavas, with an excess of vayu. Caraka himself subscribes to this view when he says that an excess of insipidity will bring about diseases of vayu (Sutra-sthanam. 26.52).

Bharata seems to have been aware of the very close resemblance between bhayanaka and its counterpart, kasaya in Ayurveda. Stambha, sweda, vepathu, swarabheda and vaivarna are all sattvika-bhavas, showing a predominance of vayu. The characteristic features of bhayanaka Rasa are very similar to the characteristic features of Kasaya in Caraka. In Bharata, these are

गात्रामुसदृष्टिभेदैरुस्तम्भाभिवीक्षणोद्देशैः ।

सन्नमुस्वशोषहृदय स्पन्दनरोमोद्गमैश्च भयम् ॥

... ..

करचरणावेपथुस्तम्भाग्रहृदयप्रकम्पेन ।

शुकोष्ठतालुकण्ठैर्मयानको नित्यमभिनयः ॥ 6.70,72 (52)

The characteristic features of bhayanaka, according to Bharata, are stambha, drying up of mouth (mukha-sosa) and palpitation of heart (hrdaya-spandana). It is very interesting to note that Caraka also speaks of stambha as a result of an excess treatment with insipid rasa. (Sutra. 26.51). Mukha-sosa and hrdaya-spandana in Bharata's bhayanaka seem to have been taken over from Caraka's asyam sosayati, hrdayam pldayatyudaram-adhma-payati (Sutra. 26.52).<sup>65</sup> Susruta also holds that there is hrid-pidasyasosa-udara-dhvana with an excess of Kasaya (Sutra. 42.14).

Bharata's analysis of the vyabhicharibhavas of bhayanaka is again very close to the reactions of a treatment with an excess of Kasaya. The vyabhicharibhavas of bhayanaka are stambha, sweda, gadagada, romanca, vepathu, swarabheda, vaivarna, sankha, moha and trasa, and apasmara. These vyabhicharibhavas show all the symptoms of an excess of vayu, and as such, have been included among the sattvika-bhavas. These are all the characteristic traits of a treatment with an excess of kasaya, which will inevitably lead to such diseases as are vataja (Caraka. Sutra. 26.62).

Such extensive and wide-spread parallelisms even in details could never have been accidental. It is not just a case of parallelism. Bharata seems to have consciously drawn upon the speculations of Indian Ayurveda. It will be seen later on how deeply the concepts of sattvikabhava in ch. VII and vyabhicharibhava in ch. VIII have also been influenced by kindred speculations in the Ayurveda. It is enough to note for the present that Sringara and Madhura, Hasa and Amla, Raudra and Katuka, Karuna and Lavana are but manifestations of one entity, which is now being taken in through the eyes and ears, and at the next moment, is tasted through the mouth. (See Ch. III).

## IV

Bharata's *Rasa-sutra*, *vibhava-anubhava-vyabhichari-samyogena rasanishpatti* gives a prominent place to *vibhava* or *ahara*. From the foregoing analysis, it will have been noticed that the *vibhavas* which are *Indriyārtha* are taken in by the *Indriyas*, and the message is sent forward to the *manas*. The *Arammana* in *Abhidhamma* analysis provides the starting point of a process of evolution, which culminates in the realisation of *Rasa*. But there is a long gap between the first beginnings in *vibhava* and their culmination in *Rasa*. Most writers on Indian *Alamkara* look at *Rasa*-realisation as instantaneous. But cognition in Indian analysis shall have to pass through *indriya* (sense), *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect) and *atman* (soul). The very real difference between *jñāna* and *bodha*, between intellectual apprehension and aesthetic appreciation is to be explained from this standpoint. It appears that while *jñāna* or intellectual apprehension is of the mind, *bodha* or aesthetic appreciation is of the very nature of the soul. So *bodha* shows a further refinement, a subtler consistence, than what is possible in *jñāna*.

The outside world, which is *ahara* with the followers of *Patanjala*, *arammana* with the Buddhists, *vibhava* with the *Alamkarikas*, provides us with a number of stimuli. These stimuli cannot be satiated unless these rest in the soul (*atma-visranti*). The *citta* takes on the character of the object (*visayakara-vritti*), when the *citta* takes in the object of sense through the *indriya*. The *ahara* of the world of sense, *indriya*, *citta* and its *vritti*, all these are of the nature of *jada*. Whatever is *jada*, is by nature non-revealing. But at the moment of *bodha*, this naturally non-revealing *jada* substance comes to reveal itself. But revelation or flashing-forth, *spuradrupata* does not belong to any of these. It belongs exclusively to *atma-caitanya* or soul-substance. So things of the outside world, the *ahara* of *Patanjala* or *vibhava* of *Bharata* cannot flash forth or become vibrant, except with the participation of soul. These messages or stimuli of the outside world are brought close to *caitanya* by the *indriyas* and *citta-vritti*, so that these messages themselves might take on the character of the soul. *Jada vastu* can only reveal itself with the participation of *atma-*

caltanya. This sphurana or revelation of jada-vastu at the moment of bodha, is thus made possible by the participation of atma-caltanya; and so the expressiveness of the outside jada world is completely dependent on atma-caltanya.

There is a world of difference between the knowledge of a thing (jnana) and its imaginative or aesthetic apprehension. The eitta-vritti taking on the character of the object of sense, may be called the jnana or knowledge of it. So this jnana is also of the nature of jada. But when there is an imposition of caltanya on this eitta-vritti, then it is called anubhava or bodha. It should be clearly noted that vritti and bodha, knowledge and apprehension are two very distinct things, vritti being jada, bodha being ajada or eitswarupa. This has been very clearly established in the Samkhya analysis. Vijnana-bhikshu says in Samkhya-sara . . . "Vivekavrittibodhayoo tarkika yatra sammoda, samkhyanam srestata jatas. Jenatma-sruta-muda eemay bandhastamasina, vritti-bodha-avivekana menire ksanikam citim". Vijnana-bhikshu means by this that ignorant people cannot appreciate the distinction between vritti and bodha, or knowledge of a thing and the apprehension of it. The Samkhya teachers have very clearly analysed the distinctive qualities of knowledge (jnana) and apprehension (bodha). But the Naiyaikas seem not to have understood this difference very well. In the Nyaya-sutra (I. 1.15), Gotama writes, buddhi-rupalabhdijnanamityanarthantaram. Intellect, apprehension and knowledge—these are not different from one another. The term apprehension (upalabdhii) is generally used in the sense of perception (pratyaksha). According to Samkhya analysis, buddhi stands next to purusa, in the order of involution, and is, as such, altogether different from knowledge (jnana), the abode of transparent consciousness. Gotama says that jnana and upalabdhii are identical, though it has been just noted how they are essentially different. It appears from this that the very real difference between jnana and bodha was not well-understood by the Naiyaikas. The Srutis also speak of atman as of the nature of knowledge. The Buddhists also did not clearly recognise the difference between jnana and bodha, and look upon vritti-jnana as soul itself. This vritti-jnana is by nature, short-lived, and is destroyed in a moment (ksanana-vidhamsi). This has led the Buddhist philosophers to think that soul itself

is destroyed in a moment. But really speaking, the atman which has been called as of the nature of jnana in the Srutis, means something very different from vritti-jnana. It is, on the other hand, of the nature of bodha or apprehension. Vritti-jnana might be of a short duration; but bodha is everlasting. The Buddhists could not distinguish between transient jnana and eternal bodha. They were thus led to believe that the soul itself is transitory. The Bodha is of the nature of purusa; the vritti-jnana is of the nature of citta. The purusa is cetana, while the citta is jada. So jada-vastu can flash out or become vibrant only when it rests in atma-caitanya. In Rasa-realisation, the taking-in of the objects of sense by indriyas is the result of the activity of citta. The message brought in by the senses through the mediation of vayu, is then transferred to caitanya. Thus far, there is no great difference between the receptions of messages of the outside world by different indriyas, between aharas tasted by the tongue and aharas taken in through the eye and the ear. But still there is a world of difference between apprehension of sense-objects in life, and the apprehension of sense-objects in art.

The difference between these two apprehensions seems to be this. At the moment of apprehension of objects in the world of sense, the caitanya flashes forth as just cit-matra. But there is in this atma-caitanya, a natural love of ananda, which resists sorrow. This ananda seated in the soul naturally flashes out; but the citta being excessively disturbed, and turned outward (bahya-pravanata), cannot reflect the clear stream of ananda. In other words, though the soul goes on reflecting ananda, the reflection itself becomes unmanifest. At the moment of Rasa-realisation, the citta is turned away from all outward motivation by the help of vibhava, anubhava and vyabhicharibhava. There is a flow of the purified sattva of the citta; at the same time, the citta becomes perfectly calm like a tranquil sheet of water. There is a mirroring and reflection of the ananda of the atma-caitanya in this surface of the citta. The manifestation of the joyful (anandarupata) nature of the soul (atma-caitanya) is Rasa-enjoyment. When the purified sattvic citta-vritti, which has become extremely refined, and is completely introvert and turned back upon itself, then there is a reflection of the joyous nature of the atman in this



vritti of the citta. There is no such reflection of this joyous nature of soul in ordinary citta-vrittis. But at the moment of Rasa-enjoyment, the citta becomes extremely refined and subtle, though not completely so (see Ch. IV). This results in the manifestation of citta-vrittis, which are now introvert. The bliss of the soul is reflected in this citta-vritti; and thus there is the realisation of Rasa. This bliss or ananda being of the nature of soul, reveals itself. At the moment of Rasa-enjoyment, the citta in its purified Sattvic state of vritti, colours and makes manifest the unmanifest soul. The soul thus goes on enjoying through the mediation of citta. Taste and things tasted are thus the same thing, appearing differently from the standpoint of karma and kriya, or action and passion in Aristotelian analysis. This explains how there can never be complete purification of the soul in Rasa-enjoyment. This purification of the Sattva has necessarily got to be of an aprakita nature. The citta at the moment of Rasa-enjoyment, completely dissociates itself from all extrovert attitudes, and becomes perfectly introvert. Mammata also speaks of this bahya-baimukhya-pada of the Rasa-enjoyer at the moment of Rasa-enjoyment. The poet is trying to do the same thing as the ascetic. The ascetic achieves this introversion of citta by long and continued penance. He checks the outward flow of the citta; and makes it turn inward. The poet achieves this introversion through the magic of colour, rhythm and alamkara. This is a less arduous process of purification, but no less effective than the one used by the Yogins.

It is not always understood that the extrovert citta is the cause of ail sorrows, while the introversion of the citta contributes to pleasure and delight. If a man can withdraw his citta-vrittis from the outside world, and rests content in his own self, then he can be supremely happy. Such a state is life in a second heaven. The reading of plays and poems is such an instrument for achieving this life, where all faculties have been withdrawn. The sahrdaya at the moment of Raja-enjoyment becomes completely self-absorbed, and loses all sense of the outside world. This is what is known in Rasa-enjoyment as tanmayi-bhava. It has been noticed at the beginning of this chapter, that vibhavas appear to the citta as ahara. The citta takes in these vibhavas as bhoga. As a result of enjoying the vibhavas or bhogya-

vastu, there is in the citta an emergence of an extremely refined sattva. The emergence of this refined sattva makes the citta turn away from things of sense. So an apprehension of things of sense will inevitably lead to a turning away from them. The height of enjoyment always goes with complete renunciation; and this is apparent in aesthetic appreciation more than in anything else. The excellence of aesthetic delight is that at such a moment the citta cannot take in anything else. The citta becoming completely self-absorbed, is compelled to renounce things of sense as such. The great difference between enjoyment of ordinary things of sense, and enjoyment of things in the world of art, is this. The enjoyment of ordinary things of sense always increases an appetite for it; na jatu kama kamanam-upabhogena samyati. But in the enjoyment of Rasa, the citta is completely satisfied, and becomes perfectly detached from the sensuousness of objects of pleasure. The enjoyment in ordinary life can never satisfy all our wants. Either there is a sense of excess of enjoyment, or there is a feeling of hidden want. There is never a completed sense of satisfaction. This absence of satiety keeps alive the hankering after things of sense; but a completed sense of satiety is just opposed to this. In the satiated soul, there is no hankering after objects of enjoyment. The Bhagavad Gita writes,

यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः ।

यस्मिन् स्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचान्यते ॥ (54)

A satiated condition of the soul is possible only when that something has already been achieved, which leaves nothing more to be desired. In such a condition of completed satisfaction, the body and the mind and senses, all become lax. The prana which is the source of all activities, and which is the source of all activities, and which is seated in the hrdaya (see Sec. I) is hardly able to keep the body alive. It cannot send or direct the indriyas to receive the message; the manas cannot be determined (samkalpayukta) in the absence of prana. At this moment, the movement of prana is perfectly balanced. Prana rests in samya. To say that the movement of prana rests in a perfect equipoise, is to say that the movement of prana has almost ceased. The body and the senses are restless, when the movement of prana becomes uneven. The body and the senses go out and seek

new pleasures. But with the even movement of prana, when a perfect equipoise has been reached, a state is arrived at which is just opposed to this. In Rasa-enjoyment, what is enjoyment in outward appearance becomes complete renunciation on a closer analysis. The enjoyment of common objects of pleasure always increases the appetite of it. But in the enjoyment of objects of art, the things of sensuous apprehension instead of whetting the appetite, foster the the ideals of renunciation. In a word, the man instead of being self-centred, becomes self-composed. In susupti, the jiva even when living and motivated and directed by prana to new sources of pleasure, cannot take in these, because of a completed sense of satisfaction. Then the body and the mind and the senses become irresponsible. They are averse to sensory gratification. But there is such a divine sense of pleasure that in susupti, the highly wrought and expectant jiva lets go the objects of pleasure out of his own accord. At such a moment, the outside world of sense can only be a source of displeasure. It is very similar to the case of a sensuous man when resting with his dearest wife. At the moment of their union, the sensuous man loses all sense of reality. He can no longer distinguish between what is outside and what is in ; he cannot take in either outside objects or objects which are in him. He makes no distinction between sleep and waking. All duality ceases. The Prajnāpayaviniscayasiddhi. IV. 1, writes, "If one gives up both extremes (the extreme of the void and the extreme of the non-void), one is set free. The idea of an ego has no longer any support. For this reason, the dualistic mode (of thinking, which always enslaves us), must be given up". So also at the moment of Rasa-realisation, the citta being completely satisfied with the vibhavas, loses all sense of distinction, and rests in its own self. This is what may be called atma-visranti. In atma-visranti, the citta becomes detached from sensuous things. The citta is always taking on the character of objects of sense. But there are methods prescribed in the Yoga-sutra of making the citta free from all objectifications. These are difficult methods and not easily achieved. The citta on the other hand, can easily become free from all objectifications through the reading of plays and poems. The reader of a poem or the spectator of a play becomes expectant, when the poet or the dramatist brings before

him a new world of vibhavas. In his eager expectation of receiving the vibhavas of the poem and the play, there is a change in the citta of the reader or of the spectator. There is submergence of the inhibited visayas, already present in the citta of the reader along with the new visayas, freshly presented to him by the poem and the play. The objectifications in the world of art have reached a perfect balance and harmony with those others, already present in an inhibited form in the mind of the reader or the audience. A detailed analysis of how this submergence takes place will be made in Ch. X. The citta which is always gathering messages of the outside world through the hrdaya, is very often lost in the details of what it has collected. But the vibhavas in poems and plays, act as a very fine and delicate purgative. The fresh materials presented in poems, come to combine with the inhibitions already there in the mind of the audience; and these then go out together, leaving the citta untainted and purified. The citta then turns back on itself. At such a moment, there is an enjoyment of pleasure, which knows no hindrance or limitations, and where all passions have subsided. Such a state is unattainable for creatures of the world. Only an approximation is possible in Rasa-enjoyment. There is no better method of achieving this purification than by the reading of poems and plays. In aesthetic enjoyment, what is thus bhoga to outward view, shows the highest ideals of tyaga.

The reason why the citta can never be balanced, is that it is always burdened with impurities. These impurities are always throwing the citta off its balance. But the moment these impurities are removed, the citta goes on expanding, and attains a perfectly balanced state. There is a vispharana of the citta. The impurities of the citta are contracting the citta, and retarding its expansion. There cannot be any ananda or delight, when the citta is contracted. The citta is naturally of an expansive nature. But the citta loses this expansiveness, when it becomes impure. The citta expands, and regains its original balance, even with the temporary removal of impurities. At this moment, there is a bursting out of pleasure and delight. There will be ecstatic delight if by any way whatsoever the citta could have been made to expand. Among all commonly practised methods for effecting this expansion of the citta, the